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CHAPTER I 
In order to understand the dramatic controversy in the American 
Senate over the provision in the Versailles Treaty for a League of Nations, 
it is necessary, to be conscious of the state or mind of the United States 
at the opening or World War I, to be acquainted \dth the id.eals and aims of 
the president, Woodrow Wilson, to be aware or the advocacy of the League to 
enforce pea.ce by the Republlcan _-president William H. 'l'aft, and finally, to 
know the rea.sons for the opposition in the Senate, in contrast to .. the vibrant 
support afforded president Wilson d.uring his .tint term. 
The trooi tional dogma of poll tical isolation dominated American 
thought, but in reality, the nation was becoming more and more involved in 
world. affairs on every aide. ~ince the Spanish American War, the United. 
States had assumed a place among the world powers.l It was committed. half.'wq 
around the world in the Philippine Islands; it occupied. the strategic center 
of the Pacti'ic at Hawaii, it had built the Panama Canal and was gradually ex-
tending its control over the Caribbean Sea. American interest in Latin 
Am.erica .. theoretically established a century before by the Honroe Doctrine 
had become intensely practical in Ic1exico. 
American trade had become .. almost by magic. world iti1.ue. Marruf'ac-
turers of st.eel, cotton and machinery were invading all the countries or the 
earth and facing bit.ter competition with the British, the Germa.ns, the Ii'rench 
... 
1 nay Stannard Baker, The Versailles Treaty and Atter, New York, 
1924, 7. 
I 
I 
II 
2 
and last with the Japanese. Hore Am{Jrican money was L'fJing invm:rt,cd in nussia, 
. 
China and Latin Amerioan than ever bet ore. To say that America had no inter-
est in world affairs or was isolated and aloof in 1914 was absurd. 
Vi.'hile the Amerioan people 'Were vlalldng with. tu~eir heads "in a cloud 
or traditional and sentimental isolation", their feet were taking them into 
every kind of bewildering international complications.2 This doubleminded-
ness of American opinion elq.Jl'CSsed. itself vividly a.'uring the first two years 
of the \;lorld War. President rJUson's procr<:ml from first to last was one of 
peace. Ar.r:r stl.l.d¥ of his messages, speeches I and letters will show that, above 
evcrzrthing else in the turmoil, President t-/Uson was thi&...ine ani working for 
a sinela goal - trying to use the miGhty pwer and prestige of .America to 
bring the blessings of peace to the 'Wol'ld. 
During the Hexican crisis when certain interests were moving heaven 
and earth to drive us into h08tili ties, Wilson declared with solemn earnest-
ness! 
We cannot J!ilect this European situation, and use our pO'IIIer 
to bring world~e if we have one hand tied behind us in a 
\:n:.1" "'lith Mexico~ J 
Not satisfied to serve as a passive custodian of our great tradi-
tions II Wilson desired to expand the sphere of their influence and to put 
I 
them at the greater service of manldnd. This be proposed to do with a J,eagu a 
2 ~., 7-8. 
3 ~., 9. 
4 Arthur Bemon Tourtcllot, ed., Woodrow fJilson Selections for' 
T9AA,y, New York, 193$, $1. -
.3 
of Nations whicb was a partial pla:n for internationalizing the world.. This 
plan aimed at a world federation of nations sibrl.lar to the federal government 
established b.1 the North American states in 1789.' 
Wilson '8 plan for a League of Nations was not new for it had a life 
of three oenturies behind it. Saints and philosophers had been its notarl6s,6 
but it was not until the twentieth cent-uri that it entered the realm of prac-
tical politics as a result of the horrors of the Russian-Japaneae 'Waz.7 
Theodore Roosevelt's partiCipation in the arbitration settling the 
nussian-Japanese War qualified him to introduce a scheme for \lorld peace. 
In his speech before the Nobel Prize Conmlittee in Christiana, NoI'\~ay in 1910, 
he urged the further developm.ent of arbitration in settling disputes. This 
famous address included both his criticism of the preva.il1ng Hague Tribunal anc 
suggestions for a means of assuring safety. In Roosevelt'8 opinion, IlThe 
supreme difficulty in connection with the developing of pel:U.~e at the Hague 
arose from the lack of an executive power or of any police power to enforce 
the decrees of' tile cou.r1i." Roosevelt believed it would be a Ilmaster stroke 
if' those great powers honest~ bent on peace would form a League of Peace, not 
only to keep peace among themselves, but to ;;revent, by torce if necessary, 
its being broken by others." 
;; Scott Nearini' United World, The Road to International Peace, 
New York, 1945, h5. 
6 HtmI7 Noel BraiUord, ed., A L!!9rne of Nations, 2nd «1. New York, 
1920, 59. - -
7 "The League to Enforce Peace," I~$llt, N ew York, LXXXVI, 
June, 1916, 358. 
4 
To insure safety Roosevelt s~geated that, "Each nation rrhst keep 
well prepared to defend itself until the estaolis.l:W1ent at some form of inter-
national. police power, competent and willing to prevent violence ••• between 
• •• natiOll8 to oommand. peace throughout the world could best be assured by 
some oombinations between those great nations which 8in~ desired peace 
and have not themselves tli.o'Ugh,t of oClllm1tting aggression." The future anti-
League leader was oertain at this time that the "ruler Or statesman who would 
bring about such a oombination would have earned. bia place in history tor all 
time and bis title to the Gl"i;ltltude of all manldnd." 8 
The horrors or the great catao~ had been so t.errlble that 
Roosevelt was certain that the combatants would be \dl.ling to consider a 
world court supported by force.9 In a statement af'ter statement Roosevelt 
showed that he was re~ to tbrow the waole force of a league against any 
nation which transgressed at the expense ot another nation ~ of the rights 
which had been guaranteed to all. He also realized the ~ objections that 
would be brought against his plan, but he was confident that it would put the 
"oollective strength of civilized manld.nd behind the collective purposes of 
ma."lk1nd to secure the peace of righteousness t the peace of justice among the 
nations ot the earth." 10 
8 ~., LXVIII, ~, 1910, 1027-29. 
9 Theodore Roosevelt, America.!!!! ~ World War, NEM York, 
19l5, 18-9. 
10 Ibid., 82-3. 
• 
Roosevelt was not alone in his belie.f that the dq had passed When 
. 
nations could ignore the need of organization to ma:1ntain peace, but at the 
same time, the urgency of applying this pr...nciple to all the nations had be-
come apparent to ex-Pn'Sid.ent WUliam H. Taft, who voioed his opinion to a 
group at the OentUlil Club, New York, in OCt.ober, 1914. "The time has come 
when the peace loving nations of the world should organize tbemael ves into 
some sort of society in which they s.hould agree to settle their own disputes 
by amicable methods, and s~ to any nation tha.t sta.rted to go to war, 'You 
have got to keep the peace or have all the rest of us against you! InU So 
many other Americans thought along the same lines that, on June 17, 1915, in 
Independence Hall, Philadelphia, a League to Enforce Peaoe was formed with 
amost one thousand Americans cooperating.12 
This League desired the United States to join a lea.&:rue binding the 
signatories. to submit all justiciable questions to an international oourt 
of justice! to submit all otber questlO1l8 to a council of conciliation for 
hearing, consideration and recommendation, to use their economic and mU1tary 
forces against arq members committing acts ot hostility aeainst another be-
fore Su.bmit.ting to arbitration oX' conoiliation. and to hold periodio oonfer-
ences to formulate and oodify international law.JJ 
Tbe President had been slow to identi.t"J hi_elf with the Lea.:;ue to 
11 F. H. ~ncll'J "Tatt'. Labors tor International Peace," Current 
Histoq, lJew York, XWI, }tay, 19.30, 297. 
12 "The League to Enforce Peace," Ir:9!?ende:nt, LXXXVI, 346-7. 
JJ T. H. Diokinson, I!:! United States .!!!! l!:! IfgaIue, New York, 
1923, 14-15. 
6 
J:::n..f'orce Peace or even to accept the invitation tendered by I·Ir. Tatt'\o d.el1ver 
an address on Hav 27, 1916, at the. New rIUlard 'Hotel, Wash1rllt.~n, D. C.. At 
this meeting one of the principal speakera was no less a personage than Sena-
tor Cabot Lodge with Mr. Taft presiding. 14 
For ~\Y months the President had been revolving this idea in his 
mind and for a long time he was reluctant to accept aqy invitation that would 
seem to give aplJroval. to the idea. lie patiently waited to make a complete 
survey of the world Situation, and to be oonvinoed that the permanent parti-
cipation of' the United States in world ai"fairs was a necessity if peace were 
to be secure. 15 
It was not easy to draw the President away .from: the traditional 
policy of aloo.fness and isolation which charaoterized the attitude of the 
United States in all international affairs, but the invitation to discuss uni-
versal. peace, urged upon the President by the Republioan ex-President William 
H. Taft was finally accepted. 16 
In that address President \oJilson said. 
We are partiCipants, whether we would or not, in the life 
of the world, and the interests of the nations are our own; hence-
forth, there must be a common agreement tor a common object, and 
at the heart of t,hat common object must be the inviolable rijjlts 
of peoples and of mankind. We believe these fundamental things t 
lh Current H1stm, Ma.y, 1930, 298. 
1$ Joseph P. Tumulty, Woodrow Wilson!! 1. Knew Him. New York, 
1921, 1.26. 
16 Ibid. 
-
7 
First, that every people has a ri~t to ch.oose the sovereignty 
under which they shall live. Second, that the small states ot the 
world have a right to enjoy the same respect for their sovereignty 
and for their territorial integrity that great and powerful nations 
expect and insist upon) and third, that the world has a ri;;.ht to 
be free from every disturbance of its peace tbat has 1 ts origin in 
agression and disregard of tb,$ rights of peoples and natiOl'ls. 11 
Those statements were unttered in the presence of Senator Lodge and applauded 
CrJ Hr. Ta..""'t and his Republican associates gathered at the banquet. 18 
The President cont.inued that he was oonvinoed that there should be 
a "universal association of nations to maintain the inviolable security or the 
highwS3' or the seas for the common use of the nations of the world, and to pre-
vent any war either contrary to treaty a,ereementa or without waming and full 
submission of the causes to the opinion of the world - a virtual guarantee 
of territorial integrity and political independence." He Yentured to assert, 
in the presence of Senator Lodge, who afterward became the leader of the oppo-
sition to these very ideas, "that the United States 18 willing to become a 
partner in any feasible association of nations tormed. in order to realize 
those objects and make them secure 4{{ainst violation." 19 
Woodrow Wilson believed that the Leaeue of Nations was the tirst 
modern attempt to prevent war by discussion in the open and not behind closed 
doors or "within the oloistered retreats or European diplomacy.1f To him the 
17 Tourtellot, Woodrow Wilson, l2h. 
18 Tumulty, Woodrow ~Uson !!. ! _Kn_cw_H ....... ir4" 421. 
19 Tourtellot, Woodrow rJilson Sel.ections !2!: T22N:, 126. 
• 
6 
LL'~~e of Nations was the essence at Chriatian.ity. 20 yet, when the League 
of Nations t advocac"',{ was taken up by Wilson, Senator Lodge, the spokesman at 
the Re,publican party at the dinner or the League to Woree Peace, became the 
leader in bitter opposition to it. 21 
Senator Lodge at this very dinner on May 27, 1916, delivered the 
following address t 
I know, and no one, I think, can know better than one who 
has served. long in the senate, which is charged with an iIportant 
share of the r atiticat10n and. confirmation of all treaties J no one 
can, I ttlink, feel more deep~ than I do the d1tticulties. which con-
front us in the work which this league - that ia, the great asso-
ciation extending throughout the oOl.Ul't.J7, known as the League to en-
force Peace - undertakes, but the difficulties cannot be overcome 
unless we try to overcome them. I believe, muoh can be done. Pro-
bab~ it will be impossible to stop all wars, but it certainly will 
be possible to stop aome wars, and thus d1m1nisb their number. The' 
w~ in which the problem must be worked out must be lett to the 
league and to those who are giving this great subject the stuq it 
deserves. I know the obstacles. I mow how quickq we shall be 
met with the stat.ement that this is a. dangerous question which ;you 
are putting into your argt..IDIEmt, that no nation can submit to the 
judpent at other nations, and we muat be caretul at the beginning 
not to attempt too much. I know the difficulties which arise when 
we speak ot B.1\Vtbing which seems to involve alliance, but I do not 
believe that when Washington warned us against entangling alliances 
he meant for one moment that we should. not join with the other civ-
ilized nations of the world if a method oould be .found. to ciimish 
war and encourage peace. 
It was a year ago in delivering the Chancellor. s address at 
Union College I made an arcument on tli1s theory, tha.t if we were 
to promote inte.m.ationaJ. law as it must be restored, we must find. 
SODle wlq in which the united. toreN ot the nation could be put be-
hind the cause of peace and law. I sa1ci then that my hearers midlt 
think that I W88 just picturing a Ut.Gpia, but it 18 in the search 
of Utopi88 tb.at great discoveries aN made. Not failure, but low 
20 Tumulty, Woodrow Wilson!!!!!.!!! Him, 427. 
21 RB\V' Stannard Baker, rae*" War, lieu lone, 225. 
9 
aim, is crime. This league 1& cert~ aiming high tor the b&le-
fits or humanity, and because the pathwQ2is sown with difficulties 
is no reason that we should tum from it. 2 
Three days later, r·!r. Wilson declarec!, 
I believe ~t the peoples of the United States are ripe tor 
entrance into an international league whose main object shall be 
to guarantee international justice and right in the whole world. 
George vlasbington wamed us ar,ainst mixing ourselves up in other 
peoples I conflicts or alliances. I shall never IQ'Selt consent to 
artf alliance that would mix us up in conflicts between other na-
tiona, but I shall be glad to join an alliance which will unite 
the peoples for keeping tIle peace of the world on the b~is of uni-
versal justice. Therein is liberation not. limitation. 23 
In his campaign for reelection Wilson continued to voice this same 
belief. 24 Up to this time there was 'Virtually no dissent in the ~ 
parts of the United States from the idea of an orga.ni£ed peace to replace the 
old drifting policy which alwqs bad and forever must lead us to war. The 
active leaders or both parties had Committed themselves Wholeheart~ to a 
league for peace which would protect the rights of all, certainly, at the 
very least, territorial integrity and independence. 2S 
The campaign ot 1916 does not sea to have produced any cleavage 
on the question. It did however, bring about an iasua between Woodrow Wilson 
and Henry Cabot Lod&e which removed any basis ot cooperation which might have 
existed. between them later. 
22 Henry Cabot Lodge, !!!! Senate .!!!!!2! Le!ee o~ Nations, 
tlew York, 1925, 1.31-2. 
23 Lars P. !lelsOZl, President viilson, the World's Peace-maker, 
Stockholm, 1919, 205-6. • , - ad 
24 Ibid.., 20~. 
2S4! D. F. Fleming, The United. States and the ~e of tlatiomJ, 
New York, 1932, 12. - - - - - , d 
10 
Wilson had approved tile cabinet's "strict acoountability" note to 
Oerm&1V on the sinking of the Lusitania, but l1ryan, his Secretary of State, 
fearing the acousation that our policy was strict with Germany, but lenient 
with Britain, (whose action was far from nawless)26 persuaded the President 
to permit him to draft an instruction to Ambassador Gerard oJ: the German gov-
e:mment announcing that the United States would be willing to submit the ques-
tion at issue to a commission of investigation on the principle ot the Br,yan 
treaties. The State Department at onoe saw the consistency ot the instruction 
with the President.s note and Wilson WaIJ soon besieged with requests to recon-
sider. He did so and on hearing the oount.er arguments ordered the instruction 
suppressed.. 27 
Senator Lodge oonsidered this a dramatic plq of forces within the 
administration and attempted to prove that Wilson WM indiffeeent to the pro-
tection or .Amerioan rights and that Gel"flUiUV knew he would not defend our 
rights beoause iShe was receiving hints that his strong words were tor home 
oonsumption. Instead. he asserted that the President's whole policy shifted 
with the currents of publio opinion to avoid doing ~. 28 
Loc.lie's accusation brought from !1r. Wilson on October .30, 1916 & 
statement published in the !!! Republic, in which be denied the truth of the 
charge. From Wilson's point of view his motives in the crisis had been 
throughout to do what was best and his best judgment had prevailed, but SenatQ '" 
Lodge felt. that his opinion of the President's conduct was correct and main-
27 Ibid., 146. 
28 Lodes,!!!! Senate.!!!! S! Leagu\~ ,2.£ Nations, 34-56. 
n 
maintained his stand.29 Shortly' af't(e,r, on January 13 J 1917, WUson ·re.f.'used to 
speak from the same platform and there 18 no evidenoe that arr:! cOrdiality was 
ever resumed. between them. 
In an address to Congress on January 22, 1917, the President dis-
closed his thoughts £orming in his mind in regard to the duty of our govern-
ment if it were called upon £or cooperation in laying the .t'OUDdation of peace 
among nations. He believed that the mission or the American democracy ttwaa 
nothing lees than" to add tbeir authority and power to the authority and power 
ot other nations to guarantee peace and. justice throughout the world. He de-
sired. to have our government ready to present the conditions upon which it 
would feel justUied in asking our people to approve ita romal and solemn ad.-
herence to a League £or Peace when the proper time arrived. 
Some o£ the conditions be considered necessary tor a permanent 
peace were. (1) a peace without victory', (2) the right of selt-determ1nation, 
(3) .t'reedom or the seas, (4) disarmament, (S) a League of Nations to adm:3..n-
ister the peace. The question upon which the whole future peace end pol1q of 
the war depended was thiet Rls this present war a struggle for a just am1 se-
cure peace, or only tor a tf!Jt1 nations to £om a new balance o£ power?" A bal-
ance of power could not cuarantee a "stable Europe.'" ~ a ccamm1ty of pow-
er would br:l.n.g organized common peace. "There was no entangling alliance in 
a concert of power." This concert would provide a foree, greater than tb.e 
force of any nation, that no ag~sive nation oould stand against. It the 
peace 1;0 be made were to endure, it would have to be a peace made secure by 
29 Ibid., 146. 
12 
• 
In reply t.o t.he President.s address~ Lodge pointed out t.o the Senate 
on February 1, 1917, the dangerous implicat.ions of t.he pr1ncivlea laid down by 
the President and definitely parted comapny with the idea ot a league of na-
tlona.31 To Lodge the idea of asking the belligorents to stack their arms and 
make peace before e1th0I' sic.!.e \Jas conquered was a strange proposal. Too, he 
predicted, many difficulties in appJ;ying the principles of self-determination 
would arise. ;''bat would be done about Korea, Hindustan, Alsace Lorraine, 
Trentino, the Slav Provinces of Austria or the Danish Duchies? Who would de-
cide whether the principle is recognized. under tho different governments of 
the world with whan we are to tom the Lea(.'Ue for pea.ce?32 
The enforcement of the doctrine ot the freedom ot the seas I Lodge 
thought would involve us in every war which might occur between maritime na-
tions. Besides, the idea of enforcing peace had lost its attraction to hita. 
The refusal of a member to abide by a decision might mean war. In that event 
every member would be obliged to send a quota of troops which would be in-
spected by the league's officers and ordered abou1i by them. 
After serious consideration his thoughts altered in regard to the 
precepts of' Wsshint:,-r'ton. Was...1rlngton's policy had been set. forth under condi-
tions not unlike t.hose which now existed and its wisdom supplemented by that 
)0 Tourt.ellot, Woodrow Wilson Selections £e! Tod&, 128-36. 
31 U. S. Oont..'T8SS, Senate, House Joint Resolution 333, 0rn-
siona]. Reco19 64th Cong., 2nd Sess., Tburs~, Feb. 1, 1917, Vol. $~ 3, 
~JashIiigton, 11, 2364. 
32 Ibid.., 2.367-66. 
or J. Ad.axas, Jefferson, Madison, 140nr0e, and J. Q. Adalne, and had be1m demon-
IStrate<! for more tban a centur.y and should not'be departc'<i .fram "witl:u:m.t most 
lPowertul reasons and without knowing exactly where the4.'Dparture would lead."ll 
rEhe league, Lodge continued, would necessitate stem realities. True, a 
league for peace sounded enoouraging, but it was a grave matter. It meant 
~utt1ng torce behind peace and making war on arty nation which did not obfq 
its decisions. Lodge presented two examples of problems such as members o£ 
the league might be forced to race .. 
1. Assume that such. a league has been tol"DlEKl ••• and that ••• 
China and Japan demand tor their people the right of tree emigra-
tion to Canada, Australia and. New Zealand. Suppose the league 
grants the permiSSion, but Canada, Australla and New Zealand back-
ed by England refuse to accept the decision. Would we be willing 
to make war on Canada in such a cause as th1a? 
2. Suppose the Asiatic powers demand the tree admission ot their 
labor to the United Statea and we resist, but the decision of the 
league goes against us, are we going to accept it? 
Detore giving our support toa league for peace, Lodge was convinced that all 
these contingencies should be considered..34 
Lodee was not unw1l.l.ing to us. the pcRIler and innuence ot the 
Un! ted. States toward a permanent, peace. He merely wanted to save us ,fraa a 
worse condition than existed. His oounter program contained tour practioable 
measures. They were. (1) adequate national preparedness, (2) the rehaMli-
tation o£ international law at the olose ot the war, (3) with necessa:r.Y and 
II Ibid., 2365. 
34 ~., 2.369. 
. .it.ural limits, to extend the use or voluntary arbitration, so tar '* possible 
and mobilize publlc opinion behind it, (b) to'urge a general reduction of 
armaments by all nationa. 
In conclusion, he heartil~ supported the reaGlut,1on offered. by 
senator Borah camdt.t1ng us without reserve to the polley of Washington and 
Honroe in regard to .foreign nat1ons. Lodge now saw nothi.ng but perU in aban.-
doning our long e.tel:! shed policy .35 
In the exc1 tement attendant upon the German submarine campaign, 
then approaching its cl.im8X, 14r. Lodge's speech attracted llttle atte.ntion.J6 
The President adv1aed our own declaration or war within a month and Wormed 
the Senate that his thoughts expressed on the preceding Januar,y twenty-second 
had not changed. WilBon made it clf'"ar that. Amed.ca was OPPOl5l.ng the German 
autocracy rathel' than the Gennan people and closed. hi. messace with the p ..... 
oration which gained wider currency tlum arq part of his messagel 
It is a tearful thing to lead thl.s great. peaceful nation into 
war ••• But the right is more precious than peace, and we sball tight 
for ••• democracy, tor the right of those who submit to author! ty to 
bave a voice in their own governments, tor the rights and liberties 
of small natiOns, tor a. universal dominion or right by such a. con-
cert. or tree peoples as shall bring peace and safety to all. nations 
and make the world itself tree.,}7 
Through the subsequent months the Pre3ident was aided by leadera 
of public opinion everywhere in driving home to the peoples of the allied and. 
enEm\f countries alike that we were engaged in a. crusade to end a.utocracy and 
- 35 Ibid., 2)70. 
J6 Fleming, UniteS Sta~!.!!! 2 League or ~ations, 18. 
37 Tourtellot, Woodrow Wilson Selections !2t T~, 137-47. 
.or. The war was li!ted to the highest place. Many men went ovenu1aa, coo-
£ident that this service or sacri.fice would help to establish a new and better 
order of atfaiI'8.38 
on January 8, 191B, the next official statement came boom the 
president in a message to Congress in which he :repeated our demand Iftbat the 
world be made fit and sare to live in.tt The mess ace included the fourteen 
points upon which be thou.ght the peace should. I,) e baaed, the last of which 
read. itA general association of nations must be tomed under specific cove-
nants tor the purpose of affording mutual guarantee o£ political1ndependenee 
and territorlalintegr1ty to great and small atates al.ike • .39 
Agair. on Februar;r 11, 1918, in an addreas to Congress analyz1ni 
Genr.an and Austrian poace utterances, the President declared again. "We be-
lieve that our own desire 1"01" a. new international order under which reason 
and justice and the common interests or mankind shall prevail is the desire 
of enlightened man everywhere •••• Having set. our hand to the task of achieving 
it, we shall. not tum back.u40 
On JulJ' 4, 1918, near the close at the war, the President summed 
up the allied war object1ves in one sentence. "What we seek 18 the reign of 
law based upon the consent or tho governed' and sustained by t.he organized 
opinion or mank1nd.n41 The whole program that he was lat.er to fight for an 
38 Lawrence,!ll! ~ Story .2!. WoocI...-ow \..JUson, 220. 
39 Tourtellot" t;!.oodrow Wil;aon Selections !2!: Todaz, lS'I-61. 
40 
41 
Ibid., 168-69. 
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both sides of the ocean is in that short statement. 
In late September when the surrender of Bulgaria forecast the end 
of the war, the President went to New York, to state as carefully as he could 
the kind of peace that should come after the conflict ceased. He spoke in the 
Hetropolltan Opera House on September 27, from a written manuscript, a thing 
he rarely did. 
The depth of Wilson's conviction that the peace must not be one or 
old-fashioned bargaining if it were to last was shown in his declaration that 
"il ••• the governments associated against GermaQY ••• intend ••• to achieve ••• a se-
cure and lasting peace that they must come to the peace table prepared to pay 
the price that will procure it. They must likewise be ready to create in some 
virile fashion the onl¥ instrumentality by which ••• the agreements of the peace 
will be honored and fulfilled... The price was to be "impartial justice" in 
every item of settlement, "no matter whose interest is crossed, and not only 
impartial justice, but also the satisfaction of the several peoples whose for-
tunes are dealt with. That indispensable instrumentality is a League o;t 
Nations formed under covenants that will be efficacious." 
The time when the League of Nations was to be formed was clear in 
the President's mind. He said, "And as I see it, the constitution of that 
League ot Nations and the clear definition of its object must be a pan, in a 
sense the most essential part of the peace settlement itself.n Wilson, con-
tinued, giving s~me details which later came to be called his five points re-
presenting this Government's interpretation of its own duty with regard to 
peace. They were, brieflyr (1) No discrimination between those to whom we 
17 
wish to be just and th08e to whom we do not wish to be just. (2) NO" settle-
~nts to the special. interest of some nations that were not consistent wi ttl the 
camnon interest of all. (3) No alliances within the League. (4) No selfish 
economic combinations and no economic boycotts except at the direction of the 
League as a. means of discipline and control. (5) Complete publicity of all in-
ternational treaties and agreements. 
It was a new d~ that Wilson looked torward to w'i th confidence. ne 
did not desire a c<:q>lete break trom the past, but ~ an advance trom it. 
If\'le still read Washingtonts immortal warning against entangling alliances with 
full comprehension and an answer:l.nc purpose. But only special and limited 
alliances entangle, and we recognize and accept the duty of a new day in which 
we are permitted to hope for a general alliance which will avoid entanglements 
and clear the air of the world for common understandingS and the maintenance 
of common rights.n42 
All during thi8 period there vas little dissent .. aside fran the 
speech of Senator Lodge quoted above, from the often reiterated purpose to or-
ganize a League tor peace detinitely at the conclusion of' the war. No disa-
greement with the fourteen points was voiced in Oongress. 43 
This was probably due to the absorption or the leadors ot the 0ppo-
sition in an effort to create a war cabinet which would take the conduct of 
the war la.rge~ trom the hands at the President. In July, 1917 an at~ was 
made to create a joint committee of both houses of Congress to assist the 
President. This movement was succeeded by a campaign led by Colonel Roosevelt 
42 New York Times, Sept. 28 .. 1918 .. pt. 12, p. 1. 
--43 David Lawrence, I!!!!!!! St0!l .2! Woodrow Wilson, 23,. 
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to head a war cabinet to conduct the 'War. First he attacked the President .in 
magazines declaring that "It#~ did. not go to war to make the world sate for de-
mocraC)'." In Chicago, Detroit, New York and other great cities he continued 
lUS attack denouncing the idea or a "soft peace" that the President might 
favor.hh 
Mr. Roosevelt's great personal fol.l.owi.ng stimul.ated him until ~ 
members of Congress concluded that on.J¥ a coalition cabinet with Roosevelt in 
charge as munitions head would meet the situation. the Democratic Chairman 
of Senate Military Affairs Committee, Senator Chamberlain" joined the move. 
ment, which culminated in a great luncheon in New York C1V on JanU&17 19, 
1918, held in honor of Senator Chamberlain and. Represcmtat.ive Kahn of 
California and attended tv' nineteen hundred people, where l>tr. Chamberlain de-
clared that the militar.Y' establishment had fallen down because or wholesale 
inefficiency.4S 
The leaders of tlle movement went to Washington where 1.fr. Chamber-
lain introduced bills creating a Munitions Department and. a War Cabinet of 
three men. t1r. Roosevelt personally led the fight tor their enactment. The 
President weathered the contest, even ask:i.ng tor himself greater powOJ'S than 
it was proposed to ,i VII to others. Wilson won one of his most striking suc-
cesses, in spite of the opposition of a number or embittered Senators in h18 
.. 
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)Wll party. 
This contest made certain a tremendous attempt of the older social 
~orces in the North to regain control of Congress in the following November. 
;hese classes representing the great industrial wealth or the country had 
;rown to look upon control as their prerogative. Mr. Wilson, as the zepre-
lentative of the equally old social classes of the agrarian South and of the 
lewer life of the West, seemed to them an interloper. The President's amas-
Lng program of action had transformed the scheme of things they were accustom-
3d to; the new tariff, the new banking system, and most of all the revolution 
Ln Federal taxation coming in with the income tax had affected their interests 
ieeply. And now he was in a fair way to prove that the "provincials" he had 
;athered around him could manage the greatest national and business effort in 
)UT history without official Republican aid. 
In addition, he talked of a new international order and said re-
)eatedly that our power would never be used again to aggrandize a:rry selfish 
lnterest of our awn on this continent or elsewhere. 
People dread changes and he promised to make as many in the inter-
lational field as he had in domestic affairs. Most disturbing or all, his 
rourteen points seemed to point to a new world order in which there would be 
tendencies toward free trade. And final.JJ, if political control was to be 
regained it must be done soon. Wilson and the social classes he represented 
aad won four straight elections. It would have been equivalent to political 
suicide for the opposition to approve Wilson; and great party groups do not 
commit suicide, however seriously individual leaders may take the current or 
20 
events. There was nothine else but a party struggle for the autumn • of 19l8.46 
46 Ibid., 262-26 
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CHAPTER II 
TliE PROORAH CH1\LLENGED IN THE SEtlA'l'E 
Dissent from the high a:1ms or the war had been almost negll.g1ble up 
to this time, but as the Congressional oampaign of 1918 approached its cloae 
Hr. Roosevelt telegraphed to Senat.or Lodge and others, on October 25, that the 
Prelident's Fourteen Points were "thorough.ly mischievous" and 'Ilrfl"Xi the Senate 
to declare against them "in their entirety.n2 The President replied the next 
dq' with bis famous appenl which he bad long considered advisable. A few ~ 
later the Republicans carried the senatorial election in five states by narrow 
majorities and won a majority of two in the Senate, incl.uding the YOtes or 
Senator La Follette, who was practically outl.awed from the party, and Senator 
llewberry whose seat was challenged from the tirst and later made untenable.2 
It is futile to argue what would have happened it Wilson had not 
made an appeal to the voters. He might have concel vabq lost even more sup-
port it be had not t akcn this action. There is n~ a swing against the 
A~.inistra.t1on in the mid-term Congressional eleetio.'lS, and this was to be ex-
pect,ed in 1918, particularq since the end 0of' the war W88 in sight. It is 
\Olell worth noting that numbers or Democratic Representatives were delighted 
'ltii th the assistance that the President. a appeal would presl.Ull&bly give them. 
1 Lawrence,.'£2! ~ storz .2! 'Woodrow Wilson, 236. 
2 David Houston, Eis!!t Years With Wilson's Cabinot, New York, 1926, 
359-360. - - f 
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Perh.aps Wilson's greatest m1st.Qke was wording ~he statement so bluntly and 80 
narrow~. He might better have followed the advice of several of his Cabinet 
members and asked tor a Congress, both Democratic and Republican, which would. 
support him • .3 
On November 18, 1918, two weeks atter the election, Wilson startled. 
the nation with the announcement that he was going to Paris as the head of the 
American Peace Delegation. A cry of protest went up frool the President.s 
critics, chiefly partisan Republicans. Colonel Roosevelt announced. that the 
President had. no right to speak tor the American people at this time. "His 
leadership had been repudiated by' them. •• at the last Congressional election ••• 
He is President ••• Ue is a part of the treaty ma1d.ng paver. but he 18 ot1l1' a 
part."b Rooeevelt and his followers alleged that the President could use his 
enormous 1nf'luence to men better advantage by' acting through instructed rep-
resentatives. In America, Wilson would be able to make decisions c~ and 
unhurriedly, removed fran personal pressure, and in tOllCh with American opin-
ion. Regardless of criticism and so-called advice Wilson decided. to go. 
The country - at least the Republicans - received another shock 
on November 29, 1918, when the personnel or. the American Peace COIlIllI1ssion was 
announced. The delegates were to be Wilson, Secretary of State Lansing, 
Colonel House, General Tasker Bliss, and Hen17 White, an outstanding career 
diplomat. 
.3 Baker, W,oodraw Wilson, VIII, .513-,14. 
4 Howrton,!:laM Years, 3.59-360. 
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Two ot the tour selections were a snY"nrise. The choice of Sec--- .. -
-I:' •• -.. 
Lansing was natural beca.use he had been a ta1th.tul and efficient assistant. 
Colonel House had long been the President.s most trusted. adviser. He bad 
been in Europe during the war and was at the l'IKmlent in close confidential 
touch with allied leaders. House could be depended upon to support every 
effort. to prevent the reconstruction or Europe on the old basis of' rival 
allianoes. Th~ most reasonable, the rema:i.ning two appointments were not. 
so expected. General Bliss, who was also in Europe with a vide knowl.ed.6e at 
cond1tions and. leaders, mil1tar,y and. othcrw1se, was an able soldier 'Who wu 
in no senee a ndlitarist. He could be counted. on to lend his .full weight to 
a. supreme effort to give the world effective leaal and pacifiC means of' settl.. 
1ng its d1sputes. 
In many wB3S the selection of' Henry' White was the moet ideal at all 
He bad had service and mew the __ of clashing national interests and de-
sires which we call European politiC8 as perhaps no man in the country did. 
He would be invaluable in Paris. Furthemore, White bad the rec<:lNWldatiOl1 
of close friendship with both Roosevelt and Lodge. Lodge was pleased by hUt 
appoiDtment to the Peace CaIIld.asion. Roosevelt was delighted.> 
The appointment .t White, however, was much condemned. Taft, and 
Root, prominent and active Jlepubl1cans would have labored 88 layal.ly u 
Wilson tor the ldn.d or peace he wanted and for the organiKtion to preserve 
it. Each had a strong and. sincere desire to advance the cause of' world peace 
S Allan Nev1ns, Tt~ Years !!: AtnerlCal D1~, New York, 1930 
'l"eetimon1al page. 
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The Senators were offended tor two reasons. F~rat, WilBon had. not cOllSul:t.ed 
them in advance) and second, unlike McK1nl.ey, be had not selected a single 
member from their ranl.."8. It was fortunate in no ser.ase of the word tor Wilaon 
and his program that be did not find it desirable or possible to deter to the 
senate.6 
yet it seems reasonab13 clear, wit.'l politics reconvened, that what-
ever Wilson did would have been subjected to strong criticism traD the 
Republicans. He was the ~ Democrat since Andrew Jackson to serve two C(Ila 
sooutive terms, and he had pushed throuGh Congress an eDCttmsive program of 
domestic reform. This had proved exceed.ingly distastetul to the big bws1neea 
interests, which were ch1et'l3 ltepublicans, and the.Y were detendned to bring 
about a return of the good old. dlqa of laissez tain. If t,he Pl'ea1dent were 
tri~t~ to dictate a liberal peace to the world his prestige would be 
so grea:t. that be might accept a third. term. The opposition believed tbat 
Wilson. must be c8feated at all costs.7 
Wilson sailed fran }OJev York on December 4, 1918, and on the lhth 
received a tumultous recept.ion in PariI.J.8 Delirious throngs turned out to 
cheer tbis American Savior wbo had helped. to defeat the Germans, and who 
seemed to promise a period of happiness. He would draw up a just peace, 
wnlch of course meant grinding OeX'Rl8ll1' to the very duet. Clemenceau said, 
6 Ibid., 347-348. 
-
7 Dodd, Woodrow WUson ~ ill.! Work, 268-269. 
8 James ThompSQQ Shotwell, !l. ~ Peace C~nrerence, New York, 1937. 
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I knew Paris 1n the glitter of the Second Bmpire. I thought 
I knew ~ Paris now I but I did not believe she could show such E!l'l-
thuslasm as this. I dontt believe there was ever an;ything like it 
in the history of tbe world.9 
While waiting tor the conference to convene, tbe President joumeyed to 
England, where he vas warmly hailed, and. to Itaq, were the demonstrations 
of blind devotion to "Voodro Veelaontf were indescribable. One workingman de-
They srq he thinks of us the poor people, that he wants us 
all to have a tair chance, that he is going to do sometbina When 
he gets here that will make it impossible tor our government to 
send us to war again. It be only had CCI'll8 soonerS I have alreadr 
lost !) two sons. Do you believe he is strong enou.gh to stop all 
Wars? 
The tirst tormal meeting of' the Ccnt'erence vas held on J8l'l\ltll7 12, 
1919. On tbia verr day the President suttered a loss or prestige t.hat burt 
him sed.ous17. The t1rst of his Fourteen Points had declarec1 tor "open c~e­
nants openly arrived at." It bad been phrased in opposition to secret 
treaties:l secret alliallCes, to the whole system of secret diplomacy that seem-
ed to have brought on the war .It seaued tunc:iamental to the President to 
drag international business i1lt.o the light or day. Tbat was, therefore, his 
tirst proposal. 
Amerioan IU'M!lpapers alone had sent about one h'Wldred and ti!ty or 
their most able correspondents to report in great detail how the peace vas 
made. The door was barred aca1mrt theae eager reporters, and at the end or 
9 London Daily MaU, as quoted in Fleming, United States and 
Leae~.2! Nations, 67. -
10 Baker, Woodrov Wilson VIII, ,SaS.!86. 
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the first cia¥ a secretary alllJ~)od. out and read to them a. dry' five line sum-
mary. The tremendous outcl¥ of the correspondents was beard throughout the 
world.ll The American nEM!Jpaparmell sent a. vigorous protest to the President 
which he put before th,e Conference and. supported, but with little result.12 
The Peace Conference had not. been a.t work very long when it was 
discovered that the hundreds of delegates of the twenty-seven Allied and 
Associated Powers gatbered in plenary seasion made too unwieldly a group for 
effective work. The Supreme Council or the CouncU of Ten was theretore d.e-
signated to do the most 1mportatlt work. It was composed ot the two ranJd Dc; 
delegates from each or the five great powera, Great Britain, France, I~, 
Japan, and the United states. Its decisions were reported from time to time 
to the plenaJ.7 oonference for final action. 
The CouncU of Ten itaelf' proved to be too cumbersome and too 
leaky a b~, and in March, 1919, it gave WB'{! to the CouncU at Four, of the 
If Big Four". This consisted of President Wilson, DaYid Ll.o;yd George, Prime 
!11ni8ter of Great Britain) Georg_ C1emenoeau, President of the COWlCil of 
Franae, and Vittorio orlando, Premier at I~. Some of the t.i.r.ae it was the 
CounoU of Three, tor orlando was frequently absent. The t.'lree leaders held 
the destiny of t.he world in tbeir hands. 
Whatever the oourse adopted, it was evidently the part of wisdaD 
to grapple with the moat urgent pl"Obl.au first. In the .ar~ &\VS of the oem-
terence the victors proposed dividing the booty, Germaa.yts oolonies, perhaps, 
11 Baker, Wood.rOw Wilson and the World. Settlement, I, t1_ York, 
1922, 1.38. 
12 Ibid., lJO. 
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the least pressing major problem. Australia, .New Zealand and the Union at 
. 
South Africa were insistent for they had not only played. an i:rportant part in 
conquering them, but were anxious to remove future German naval and m1ll tar,y 
bases. A.fter a. bitter fight, Wilson suecesst'ulJ¥ resisted a division along 
old imperialistic lines. Instead be was able to secure acceptance of the 
principle upon wideh the mandate system of the League of Nations was ultimate-
ly based.13 
In W1lson's eyes the drawing up of the Covenant of' the League of 
Nat.ionsto insure a just and lasting peace, was the most important work of the 
Canterenee. But the Allied apoteeman 88 vell as the Republicans at home, in-
sisted that the more pressing the problem of tne peace settlement be d1sposed 
ot first and that the League or Nations be organized atteJ'Wards. It vas noth-
ing less than a triumph tor him when the Conference voted, on JanuaI7 2$, 1919 
that the League of Nations be an integral part at the treaty. 
WUson, himself, was appointed chairman of the CCI1IIdsaion to draft 
the Covenant of the League of Nations. He held night sessions beginning 
Febl'W'S17 3, until he saw a. draft of' a league covenant aceepted by the Conte:r-
ence ten days later. The resultW8S hardl,y the artistic product which SO&I8 
of the proposed canterences contemplating a year's deliberation might have 
produced, but on Febru.ary 14, 1919, Wilson appee.red. before the Conference in 
plenary session and triurophantJ¥ read the cQlQpleted League Convenant.14 
lJ LL9Yd George, l~emoir& of the Peace Oonference, I. !,Jew Haven, 
1939, 121, .342,-343, 3$9-360. ' - - , 
14 Da.vid Hunt.er Miller, I!:! Drafts 2! .!:!!! Covenant, II, New York 
1928, $63. 
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In the meantiIlle, the President. s opponents, filled witb a. real 
fea.r that Wilson would succeed in creating and that they would have to kill 
the peace trea.ty in order to destroy 1 t, bad decided that a determined drive 
to prevent its creation was in order. They believed it would be best to do 
this through a plea tor postponement. A conferenc~ was beld between Lodge 
and Roosevelt's groups at Roosevelt's bedside in Roosevelt Hospital when the 
two 1.rlarr10rs decided to attack whatever League proposal the Pres:1dent might 
bring home with so many emendment8 and reservations that part,icipation by the 
United States on the terms agreed upon by the President and tlle other powers 
might be ei'reot1ve];y checked. The political consequence of permitting the 
President to have the credit for leading us into the League of Nations might 
be disastrous. All that had been won in the election of 1918 might be lost 
in 1920.15 
Lodge and his party believed that, 1£ in submi tUng the charter 
to the Senate Wilson would be presented with a set of terms that be could not 
accept without great loss of prestige he would be too stubbom to submit the 
crowning achievement or his career to su.zmna.ry treatment at their hands. Lodge 
had cooled to the idea of a league and Roosevelt had. agreed with him that the 
thing would be a war breeder rather than a peace maker. 
The main point of the plan or opposition was to amend the Single 
purpose mentioned in all the President's addresses - that all the members 
15 Baker, Woodrow Wilson ~.:!:l! World Settlement, 218. 
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of the league should have tb.eir territories and political. independence guar-
anteed against aggress1on. This was the cornerstone of the plan. All the 
~ork of the League to Enforce Peace, and. all. the Pres1dent t s thin1d.ng, pointed. 
to the CotmnOll guarantee of the safety of each. Before Article X. was written, 
the 0't>pos1t1on set its face against the bas10 idea on which the struoture was 
to be reared and never swerred fram its purpose to nul.l.1ty 11'.. 
Could the American people be aroused to support the deteat or the 
~dea of a league of peace? Yes, the thing to do was to call it an entangling 
ialliance, stand on l<lashington'8 Farewell Address and show by countless hypo-
tl18tical oases that American troops might, in this contJ..ngency or that, have 
rt,o be sent to the ends of the earth. The idea of having the boys at home was 
!very popular. It could turther be shown, moreover, that we would be in con-
rt,inual danger of being outvoted in the league by the small states it equal :re-
~resentation was given or by colored raC3ea it population were to be the basis. 
~be outcry against the votes of the Br1tish Dominion in the ,A,ssembly was a 
p,ater refinement of the original idea. 
At the same time an equal number of tears of 1nter.ferenoe in 
Mterican affairs oould be aroused. It would be easy to show that the Monroe 
Doctrine was endangered and mill10ns whO only d!:"J.y understood what that 
sacred Doctrine was would rue to defend 1t. other large groups oould be 
_",_eel by the old danger of the poss1bility of immigration being .forced upa'l 
1lS, and the new one of the danger of tar1tts be1ng attected. In short, if 
lenour.h questions could be raised, the people could be convinced. that instead 
~t being a league for peace, the thing was re~ a dangerous breeder at dis-
)0 
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cord or var .16 
on December 19, Senator Lodge announced in the Senate that on the 
21st he would address the Senate It on the question of peace and the proposed 
league of nations,17 Hia speech or the 21st was a long one. It began by 
asserting the right ot the Senate to advise as well 88 consent and quoted 
maqy instances where the President had asked the advice or the Senate. He 
declared that now it was the solemn and i%!{Jerati ve duty or the Senate to give 
the advice that had not been invited. by' the negotiators. 
We cannot compellntormation but we are abundantly able to 
make our opinions known not only to the President. but to the Allies, 
who have a Yery acute and olev idea or the power of the Senat.e in 
regard to treaties. They must know that the Senate oan and otten 
has rejected treaties. others, the senate has refused to ratif'y and 
held without action. The Allies should not be held in the dark as 
to the views or the senate.18 
The groundwork for the tuture campaign was being la1.d. The senate 
was not to respond. to requestD tor advice made by the PresidentJ it was to in-
fluence the negotiations oontr2l7 to biB deail". as fully a 8 apecches in the 
open Senate ooulc1 do so. The drive for postponement ot the league was to be 
pressed, and in case it and othor attempt.s to control the counse of the nego-
tiations failed, the country and the Alli~ should understand that the treaty 
would be drastica.l.q handled in the Senate. 
Tbe Senator proceeded to outline in detail the territorial settle-
ments that should be made and to demand heavy indemnities, not only tor 
vessels sunk, but tor a part at least of our war expenditure. Some methods, 
-
16 Fleming, United States .!!'2 ~ LeY'!!, 72-76. 
t'. 17 Congressional Record, 6.$ Congress, lrd Session, Dec. 19, 1918, 
;)7, pt. I, Wasilington, 1919, 672. 
18 Ibid., 724. 
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not named, lIUSt be taken to safeguard the new nationa • 
. 
Concen:d.zlg tbe Fourteenth Point, we were all lovers ot peace, 
But we ought to be ctreme~ careful that in our arforts to 
reach the millenium of urJ.vcr:.JaJ. and eternal peace, we do not create 
a system which w1ll breed dissensions and wars. It 18 difficuJ.t to 
du.scuss it at this time because no definite plan of any kind has 
yet been put forward by an responsible person ••• It is easy to talk 
about a league of natiOns, hut the hard, practical demand is, 'Are 
you ready to put your soldiers and your sailors at the dispositiaa 
of other nations? • .Are we read;y to abandon the Monroe Doctrine and 
to leave it to other nations to say how American questions should 
be settled and. what steps we shall be permitted to take in order 
to guard our own safety or to protect the Panama Canal? Are we 
read¥ to have other nations tell \la by a majority vote what atti-
tude we must assume in regard to iDlnigration or in regard to our 
tariffs? These are lesser pOints, but they must be met and an-
swered before we commit ourselves to pemittinc an association ot 
nations to control 1n any decree the forces of the United States.19 
The Senator's cry was repeated by the 't/as!:!PJ;tol! ~ in an edi-
torial, "No Soyereign Wanted" on December 23rd. The same day found Colonel 
Harvey mak1.ng a speech in New York, nNo League of Nations to Enforce War." 
Quoting Washington's Farewell Address extensively and lauding the Honroe 
Doctrine, be demanded. that the Allies should deal with Germml7 attar the 
United States collected our 1nder.m1ties troa her. OUr object in entering the 
war thus accompllshed, the peace oanf'erence might before adjourning turn the 
league ot nations question over to international comm:1ssions, for i.nveatiga-
tion and report to the powers for "such treaty and action as they might. de-
sire.1I20 
19 Ibid. 
20 Fleming,!!:! United States .!!!! ~ Leai?'!! .2! Nationa, 80. 
32 
• 
A dispatch published in the Kansas 9itZ.2!:!t on December 22. re-
porled. that Senator Knox's speech or December 18 had been published in the 
PariS papers and was bd.ng widely discussed. The AMerioan delegation teared 
it would enoourage European opponents of' the League to active OP1Josit1on to 
the whole idea. On Christmas day Paul Scottt1aurar wrote that, particularl\v 
before the President.s arrival in Paris t the speeches ot such men a5 Colonel 
HOO6evelt. Senator Lodge and Senator Knox were widely reproduoed to prove 
that ~1r. Wilson had lost the people's support. on the other band" he contin-
ued, "President UUson1s reception in Paris proved to be a signal tor a great. 
awakening throughout Europe as to the tremendous issues at peace ••• It became 
apparent that Mr. Hilson was not ~ accepted by the liberals througbout. 
Europe as their natural leader, but that he was looked to tq the inarticulate 
masses as their Spokesman and guide in the struggle to end wars torwer.,,21 
By Januar,r 1, 1919, Taft had ooncluded that it was not too DI&1Oh to sq tha.1; 
he (W1lacm) 18 stronger with the peoples or Great Britain, France and ltaQr 
than are the respective premiers or those cotintrics.22 
Mr. Wilson may have been strong with the people ot EUrope, but he 
was destined. tor a struggle on both sides Q£ the ocean. 13e£ore leav1nc Paris 
for home, Wilson sent a cabled invitation to the House and Senate Comm1tteea 
coneemed with foreign affairs, asld.ng them to dine with him at the White 
"louse and discuss the Loacue of Nations. He alao requested that Congress re-
21 Ibid. 
22 !bid •• 81. 
frojA trca debating the subject until hie arr1~:~:~':~ _ (U 
the high seas the Senate arwung into action. The President.s request tell on 
uns;Y'lllpathetic ears. particul.a.r13 When be pro',tJosoci to laM at Boston and make 
a speech or two on the subject before reporting to them.. 
Senator Poindexter ~ Washington opened the attack on Febl"U8Z'7 19. 
comparing the proposed League to the dreaded Soviet Government ot Russia aDd 
labeling it as the most ent.angl1ng am permanent alliance conceivable. It 
would COIlpel the United Stated to participate in the ware and controversies 
ot every other nation and assume arr:t burdensome mandate over distant terri t017 
that might be asslgned to it. It did not accept arrr Bubjects trom arbitr6-
tion and it even surrendered. to other nations the power to regulate commerce 
with foreign nations.23 
Senator Borah bailed lt as the greatest tr1wnph tor English diplo-
macy in three centuries and Senator Reed, Democrat ot 11iasouri, expatiated on 
the entire Dr! tish domination at tbe earth which was set up. lIe excoriated 
the whole ot the Covenant, t1nd.ing unbelievable things in almost every art.j.c1e 
We would be t old, tor example, that "you shall ha.ve an ar1l\V of a certa:1n alH'" 
••• "VesselB or a certain number"... and we could not exceed such numbers 
ll"Without going to Europe and asld.ng the graciOUS permission of eight gentle-
men, six ot whom proba.bq cannot apeak our language, and who bave likely 
never set foot upon our shores'" Then an "'international smelling ccmnittee'" 
would \:e around to inspect our industries adaptable to warlike purposea. We 
4l20. 
23 Congress1onal Record, 6Sth Congresa, 3rd Sess1on, 1919, 
• 
could not even aid an Irish or Canadian rebel.l:ion and we should have t.o fight 
8l\Ybod¥ who did.24 
Senator Lewis of Illinois, replied on February 23, that it the 
Council could so dictate ourtWenses 1t could destroy British Naval Supremacy 
and 1 ts members would have plenty of incentive to do so. The votes of the 
British Dcm1n1on, instead of being a danger to us would be in support on aD1' 
questiori8 of :i.:mm.1gration which the league did not have poIIer to regulate 8lV"-
wq. As for its main purpose the very existence o! the mutual guarantee 11'l 
Article 10 would prevent, most lW'S. 2$ 
When the President reached Boston on the same day he tound two 
groupe o:t his friends awaiting him, one to counsel a sinpl.e explanation of 
the League and tile other to urge a fighting speech accepting the cbal.lenge of 
his opponents. Each group was satisfied with one half of his speech. He ex-
plained the Covenant .i"ilp~ in the first halt and declared in the latter halt 
that his fighting blood was stirred. He had no doubt Where the American 
people stood on this issue. 
The historic gathering of the Senate and House COIIIIIittees took 
place at the White House on the even1ng or. Febl"Ua1'y 26, 1919. The Conference 
brought into prominence another of' the small group of men who had determ1ned 
to block Wilson in his createst endeavor at all costa. A strong, intense 
man, later a suicide, Senator Frank M. Brandigee of Connecticut, subjected. the 
President to keen cross examination upon the terms of the Covenant which in 
24 COllb'Te8sional Record, 6,Sth Congress, lrd Session, 1919,4120. 
2,S Flemjng, 1!! Treatl Veto, 13.5. 
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bis opinion left Wilson in a vel')" bad light ~eed. Speaking to the l!!! !2f.! 
Sun the next day, be said, "I feel as if I had been wanderl.ng with Alice in 
-
l'londerland and bad tea with the Mad Hatter." Lodge testified also that "The 
president seemed a.ctually befuddled about l118!\Y' important points" and Knox w110 
had posed his share or the lawyer questions to the l>t-esicient, agreed in 
equal.ly strong language.26 
The correspondent from the Sun could obtain little information 
-
immediately after the conterence, but after the Senators had. an apportuni ty 
to compose notes some of the results were amazing. The President had stated 
"with tinal1t1" t "That the United. States must surl"8nder vital points of sov-
ereignty, Chinese and J&l>anese exclusion goes out of American control into the 
bandS of the league oontrol. Ireland is to be left to the mercies of Englan&i 
The Sun insisted t1lt~t Knox, Lodge, Bnmdegee, McCumber and Hitchcock aU 
-
"agreed that the President actually made these statements." Hitchcock immedi-
ately denied the truth of ~ of the much vouched tor statement from the floor 
of the Senate, and McCumber made it emphatiCally clear, the.t he had no cora-
nection with the effort to thus ridicule and. falsify the President's effort 
to satisty the Senators. Lodge, K.naJc and 231-"andigee kept silent as to their 
conpl1city. 
The response to the ?resident's explanation of the Covenant :ind1-
26 Coqgressional Record, 6;; Cong., .3 Seas., 1919, 4528-29. 
27 Ibid., 1629-30. 
-
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cated that no scruple would stand in the vErI of t.he effort to disoredit him 
and convince the country that he had betrayed it. Nothing could be more fair. 
however, t..tw:n the recorda lett by sane ot the Republicans who attended the 
Conference. Representative John Jacob Rogers, or Massachusetts, ranld.ng 
Republican in the House Foreign Relat10na Ccxrn1ttee, wrot.e to Henr.y 'V1hite, 
Mal' 3, 1919, as tollows t 
The White House dinner a week ago tonight was a most inter-
estillg one, and in most respects a raemorable ••• He submitted him-
selt to quite rigOl'OU8 cross ar:wuation tor t,vo hours, 8lI8Ver1Dg 
.wary question easy or difficult, as f~ as pcesible andwith 
apparent candor ••• There vas no sugeestion of militant arrogance 
about. him ••• Ha showed a good general familiarity with the document 
itselt-ot -which, by t.he watf be did not have a copy at. fJ1.l'7 t.ime 
betore him during the t\~"O houro--but r think scarcely had a better 
perfect knowledge ot saue ot t11e minor details. I do not aq t.h1s 
in cn ticism, for IV impression was that be was as t.horougl:~ vers-
ed as he need have been, or 1ndeed could roasQllab~ haVe been ex-
pected to 1:8. But some of the Senators t.bere that night thought 
however, that he was not at all adequately informed. As I said, DV 
own impression was quite the oppoai te.28 
The President's conference with the Foreign Relat.ions Camn1.ttee, on 
Februa.ry 26, did not change the m1nds or many of the Republican members. Pro-
b ab~ its most important incident was the President' 8 statement that he did 
not think the Covenant could be mu.ch amended owing to the ditriculw of secur-
ing the concurrence ot the otb.er nations. 
Two ~ later Senator Lodge questioned the Covenant thor~ 
and mlnut.ely. At the close of the speech he c OQCluded that tbis machinery 
would not promote the peace of the world, but would bave a directl¥ opposite 
37 
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effect. His main effort, however, was to counsel that every item should be 
. 
investigated with utmost thoroughness and weighed with the greatest care. 
All he asked viaS consideration, time and thought.29 
On the same day Senator Lenroot, of Wisconsin, made a straight-
forward plea for amendment. He approved the general plan as proposed and 
hoped to be able to Tote for it.30 
Sex:a.tor Knox's attack, on Harch 1, was massive and complete. De-
fining and assuming the League to be & super-state he presented it as striking 
down the precopts of our Constitution, destroying our sovereignty and threat-
ening national independence. ~ I then, this plan to strangle and crush us? 
iWhat was the hurry? War l1as farther away than it had been for centuries.,,31 
SOLle minutes later the league was presented by Senator Sherman of 
Illinois, as a "Pandora's box of evil ta empty upon the American people the 
aggregated calamities of the world." It was an oligarcilJ that would tteznbargo 
our commerce, close our exchanges, destroy our credits, leave our merchandise 
rotting on our piers, shut the Isthmian Canal, order Congress to declare war, 
levy ta.~es, appropriate money, raise and support ar.m:i.es and navies lt ••• It was 
the "death knell of the P.merican Republlc •••. a :fantastic idealism, a po~glot 
philanthropy as vain as the rea.lms o:f world philosophy and morals as it is 
29 Ibid., 4529. 
-
30 C0!lk7l'essiona1 Record, 65 Cong., 3 Sess., 1919, 4569-72. 
31 Ibid., L687-95. 
38 
• 
impossible in peaceable execution.,,32 
At the conclusion of this speech, Senator McCumber took the floor 
lest the impression go out that the Republican Party as a whole W~ opposed 
to the league of nations. The critico of the league ignored its purposes 
even in assailing it. Article 10 he regarded as the very foundation stone of 
of the structure. He challenged any Senator to give a clearer and more con-
cise declaration of an agreement to preserve peace. Altogether one must be 
led far afield indeed by his prejudices to conclude that we were compelled to 
submit our domestic affairs to every nation in the world which questioned a.rry 
of our internal policies. The Covenant could not be condemned on scattered 
phrases. Honesty was needed in the discussion).3 
Senator McCumberts protest, however, did not prevent the following 
declaration from being read into the Record by Senator Lodge on the last dq 
of the session, March 4, 1919. It was signed by thirty-seven Republican 
Senators and Senators-elect, more than one third plus one necessary to defeat 
the treaty. The most striking passage of the ultimatum reads 
Resolved ••• That is the sense of the Senate that while it is 
their resolve and sincere desire that the nations of the world 
should unite to promote world peace and general disarmament, the 
constitution of the league of nations·in the form now proposed. to 
the peace conference should not be accepted b"-.f the United States 
and be it 
Resolved further, that it is the sense of the Senate that the 
negotiations on the part of the United States should be immediately 
directed to the utmost expedition of the urgent business of nego-
.32 Ibid., 4865-4867. 
33 Ibid., 4872-4887. 
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tiating peace t.erms with Ge:rmaqy satisfactory to the United States, 
and the nations with WhOOl the United. St.at(!s 18 associated. in the 
war against the German Government, end that the Pl'O}>osal for a 
lee.t,ru.e of nations to insure the peace of the wor;Ld sbould be then 
taken tiP .for careful and serious consideration.J4 
The iJew York Sun reported. 
---
As the Nassaohusetta Senator started to speak, realization 
of the gravity of the step he was taking and that others were tek-
1ng under his guidance and leadership came to him. His voice was 
stead3", but his hand, in which he beld the resolution he read fran 
was sha.ldng perceptd~. As he finished. reading the list of names, 
Mr. Lodge paused a moment, then qu1et~ le!'t tt.e haJJ 0: ":..~.a :Jenate. 
There was not a sign or approval or of disapproval tro.;.t~the Senators 
on the noor or from hundreds je..:'il!lCd in t.he salieries.J;;J 
On the evening of the sa.me day the Round Robin was pttb:.i3hoo, the 
President aaceptod. 'the cha.llenge in a 6,iJeech ill New York: City an he dc.parted. 
for Europe again, saying that when the treaty came back, gentlem.en on tbis 
side would ti.."ld the covenant "not ~,. in it, but 80 ~ tl.reo.d.s of. the 
treaty tied to the OOTenant that. you car .... "lot d:J3sect tbe covenant trOll tlle 
treaty without destroying the whole vital structure.n36 WilaOl'l api)::,~e.'ltl¥ did 
not think that the Senate would dare incur the odium or rejecting tte enth-e 
treaty. 
~!r. Taft supported the Presi(lent by deel.ar1ng :1. t to be his dutr to 
insert. the COTenant in the treaty as ind1.9I,ensable to the peace sought. Ta..."t'l 
strong support must have convinced the IiC"jJUbllC'aIl leaders th."lt the .President 
would prevail. Su.eh. conviction was needed. for during the President's &DSel"lCe 
34 Ibid., 4881. 
-
J's Dakar, Woodrow Wilson .!!!! World Sett.lement., I, 291-305. 
)6 Ibid.., 305-309. 
-
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the League had fallen into the background. T~ British Conservatives had 
rebelled almost as violently as their American contemporaries and many of the 
Continental nations were quite willing to make the peace by old familiar meth-
ods, as the American Senate Republicans dematlded. Even despite the warning 
ot the President.s New York address, the .League was gmeral.q considered dead 
when Hr. ,Jilson lar¥ied in France again on !~h 14.37 
It was sanething of a shook therefore, to read his statement of 
the 15th that "the decision made at the Peace Conference at its plenary 
session, Janu.ary 2S, 1919, to the effect that the establishment of a League 
of r~ations ahould be an integral part of the Treat)" of Peace, 18 of final 
force and that there is no basiS whatever for the reports that a change in 
the decision was contemplated." 
Thia again was plain speaking, and it produced wrathful eruptions 
in conservative quartan on both sides of the ocean, but there did not seem 
to be ar:t¥ iDlnediate vq of upsetting the decision, especially s1nce the Allies 
had not been able to find II1J'3' formula aside l'tom the League which would solve 
lI'lat\Y of the knotty problans. 
So the Conf'&rence returned to ~ League and the President took 
up the task, among many others, of amending the Covenant to aatisty its 
American critics. He was under no illusions as to the possibility or satiaf"y'-
ing a section of the opponents in the Senate. "No matter what I do," be had 
said during the return voyage, "they will oontinue the attack." But the ur-
37 Seymour and House, What REt!Hl U !ppeneci at Paris, Ne!rl York, 
1921, 4l6-4l7. - -
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gent requests of the Tart wing of the Republican pt,rtiy tor revision continued. 
by cable, and the a.dvice of his own party leaders left him no choice but to 
attempt. to meet enough of the objections . to secure ratitication in the Senate. 
lIe was sure to alam the French and their allies a.t each suggestion ot weaken-
ing the Oovenant, and his position in the Conference would be oonsiderab~ 
weakened by the necessity of asking tor conoessions, but he must attempt to 
secure the changes moat general.ly demanded regardJ.ess.38 
The original draft of the League Oovenant had been so haat~ 
throWn together that it bristled with detects. Critics in !merlea, many of 
them sincere am oonstructive, pointed to the desirability of amendment. They 
stressed, particularq, the necessity of safeguarding the Monroe Doctrine, of 
exempt10n of claaestic issues, and of p roviding tor a method of withdrawing 
from the League. Wilson finally succeeded in forcing the more reasonable of 
the Amerioan demands into the Oovenant, but in so doing be weakened b1a hand 
with the other Powers, which insisted upon equivalent coneeasions.39 
The chief' battle vas with France. Clemenceau's first demand was 
reparation tor damages caused by the Germans. He second demand was tor secur-
ityagainst a repetition ot the horror of 1931. The French desired either 1;0 
occupy Ga1"1l8.l\V' to the Rhine, or to create a butter state. :aut the pl..a.ci:ng of 
millions ot Germans under the French tlag would be a gross violat.1on of the 
principle ot sel.t-cletermination. Against such an arrangement, Wilson tought 
38 William Allen White, ~oodrow Wilson, 1929, 384. 
39 Baker, Wilson ~ World Settlement, II, 43. 
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Clamenceau with all his soul, while the French press show'ered the American 
. 
idealist with abwu!.40 A compromise was tinall;)~rea.ched. France was to occupy 
the Rhineland. for a maximum of f1fteen years, and the Saar Vall.ey for a l.ike 
period. In return, Britain and. the United States were to sign a treaty with 
France promising her armed assistance in the event of an "unprovoked" attack 
by Ge~. Alt.hough both Clemenceau and Wilson must have feared that the 
United States would spurn such an entangling alliance-as it did _.this pro-
posal WUB too attraoti ve for Clemenceau to refuse. Ll 
The next crisis was when I~ demarded Fiume, the only desirable 
ocean corridor of the newl,y created state of yugoalav:l.a-a claim difficult to 
support on a self-determination basis. Wilson appealed t,o the Italian people 
for support causing thedWlgates to leave the Conference in anger. The dele-
ga.tes received 1.mrcted1atel,y enthusiastic backing from the populace and. Wilson 
anathematized 'Where he had ehortJ.y been idolized. But be did win a hollow 
victoI7 for self-determinat1on. 
The Japanese now took advantage of the Italian crisiS to press 
their demands for German econaaic rir"hts in China's province of Shantung. 
Britain had agreed. to support Japanese claims in Sbal tung and to the Qe:nnan 
Pacific isl.ands north of the equator, in return tor Japanese support of 
British claims to the German isl.ands south of the equator. W1laon feared. .. 
Violation of sel£-determination if' Japan were given so strong a foothold. If, 
40 Lodge, Wilson .!2! World Settlement, II, 43. 
41 Ibid., lS7. 
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however, the Japsnese as well as the Italians were to 'W"ithdraw fran the con-
. 
ference, it r:dght collapse and the precious league might be lost.L2 So tLleJl 
yahoo reluctantly consented to a compromise by which the Japanese were to re-
ta1n the economic holdings of Germwv and ultimately retum the peninsula to 
China. Japan also received, under a mandate, the German Pacitic islands north 
at the equator. This whole arrange:1S8nt was expediency rather t.han justice--
a disastraus blow to lillioo's prestige as the champion or aelt-d.eterm1nat1on. 
The revised Covenant was published on A.pril 28 J the Treaty or 
Versailles was presented to the Germans on r1q 7, 1919. The Oer.maua were 
given an opportunity to st~ the bullQr document. They made bitter but futile 
protests. In particular, they resented baving been dism:med b7 a promise of 
the Fourt.een Points and then hav1ng this peace or imperialism. rammed down 
their throats. At the Hall of 141rrors, Versailles, the German delegates rEI-
1:uctantl3' signed. the treaty, June 28, 1919. 
h2 Baker, Wilson ~ World Settlement, II, ,01. 
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THE FIGHT FOR THE TREATY IN ANERICA 1919-1920 
The League was defeated in the United States, not because 
it was a League of Nations, but because it was a Woodrow Wilson 
League, and because the great leader had fallen and there was no 
one who could wield his mighty sword.1 
Whatever degree of success President Wilson may have achieved it 
was great enough to cause gloom in the band of men who had determined to deny 
him the oreation of a League of Nations. The League had not onlJr been oreat-
ad but its Covenant had been amended to meet the principle American objections 
raised against it. The entire Treaty of Peace was also completed and the 
President would soon be returning with the finished doC1llltent containing the 
League ot Nations so woven into its texture that it would indeed be impossible 
to separ~te the two.2 
The Covenant had been so favorabl¥ received in the United states 
that it seemed out of the question to defeat it d1rectl¥. A oonsiderable 
body of opposition had been aroused and many doubts raised but the leadera 
of publio opinion still stood overwhelm:i.ngly for the League. 
Lodge realized that the leaders. of public opinion, bankers. and 
capitalists were unanimously advocating the League as it had been written and 
amended. There was only one recourse, that was to arouse the masses by the 
1 T. W. Gregory (Wilson's Attorney General), 1925, as quoted in 
Bailey. Diplomatic Histor,y. 667. 
2 Fleming, United State. ~ !!'!! 182e, 20,. 
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pera1stent repetition of the cries alreq- r~ed and aI\V others that seemed. 
likely to stir the emotions of the people. The nation, moreover, might be 
wearied eventually of the whole leafj'Ue business 1£ action on it could be de-
layed long enough • .3 
There was the time essence of the thing. Lodge contacted Borah 
and obtained his support on the discussion at the treat:y by way of amend.'TleDt 
and reservation. Lodge' s plan was to ffprogre8a along tbe lines of protecting 
the interests and sare1iy of the United States ... by amemments and reservat,ions 
••• sc ••• that. a large majority of the RepubliC.Ql18 could. vote for it." Borah 
prom1sed cooperation but warned. him that in tJle end he would vote against the 
treaty.4 This \lWJ a good bargain tor both lead.era. If it cOi.J.d be executed, 
Lodge bad the certainty that at the worst the Republican trademark 'Would be 
stamped on the League.' 
Two requisites for success wenn control of the senate machinery 
and tunds necessary to expand the campaign to arouse popular sent.ilaent against 
the league. The first requisite Lodge see."OOd certain at, but the second, was 
a wony untU Senator Knox made an appeal to his Pennsyl"a.n1a friends, H. C. 
Frich and Andrew Vi. Hellon.6 
.3 George H&l."'V'ey, Herp:z.9:!t Frich..:!?!!! Marl, New York, 1928, 325. 
4 Lodge,!!!! Senate .!!!!! ~ League .2! Natio.nl!, 1l~7. 
S roid., 148. 
-
6 Harvey, H!f1!l 9.!.!t f:t;1cp ~ ~·tan, .325-26. 
The money reservoir of the"Cabal!t becD.me both deep and full. The 
second. r6quisi te of success was at hand. luajo1cing pervaded. the camp of the 
irreconcilab1es because nCM "organized iffort" to arouse distrust of the 
League would go forward an a nationwide scale backed by practicuJ.ly unlimited 
funds.7 
On Mq 19. Congress met in a special seasion to enact the appro-
priation bills. a result of the Republican filibuster or t4arch 3 and 4, design. 
ed to compel a special. session. On Mq 20, Senator Johnson, offered an unpre-
cedented resolution calling upon the Secretary of state to transmit the wU'in-
ished business of the treaty to the Senate.8 The Senators were anxious to 
begin work on 1t, though not in secret session as usual. l1r. Lodge served 
notice on the J2rd. that the document woul.d be treated ll1th "pitiless publi. 
city.It The Covenant bad been made "much WONG than be.f'ore.tt9 
Article 21, reserving the !{onroe Doctrine, said that: 
Nothing in the covenant shall be deemed to affect the valid-
ity of international engage.'1lents, such as treaties of arbitration 
or regional understandings, like tbe~ionroe Doctrine. for securing 
the maintenanoe of international peaoe.10 
But no! cried Senator Lodge on June 7, it vas never an interna-
tional underst.a.ndingl It is oursJ "It is all Our8J and now it is carried into 
7 Ib1d •• 329-31. 
-
8 Conf2!Ssional Record, 66 Cong., 1 Sess., 1919, 63. 
9 Ibid., 161. 
-
10 Ibid., 791-2. 
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urWl league of nations. It is aJ.req.- interpreted by England, althou.gh it 
. 
is whol.:q' our affair, and it is to be determined in the future by the League 
The Senate having been organized by the Repuuiloans and the in1 tial 
broadsides loosed against the Covenant, the leaders proceeded to the all :t.m. 
portant matter ot reorganizing the CODIId ttee on Foreign Relations J as Senator 
Hitohcock charged, "the Republican leaders I filled the Coum1tt.ee on Foreign 
Relations with Senators pract1oal.l.y pledged to op!)ose the League of Nations." 
This charge vaa not replied to, other than by an eftort of Senat.or 
Fall, of ~4ew ,tex:t.ct), to find out what determined the appointment ot Democratic 
members to the CODIldttee, although senator \\~ill:iams asked Senat.or Lodge to 
correct him "right now while I am on JlV teet" it he did not interA to malOll 
the League a party issue. Ur. Lodge sa.t silent.Il 
The prot,est aroused. against the league among businessmen and par-
tisan Republicans stimulated b'tJ the opponents of the Ja &btUe created anxiety 
in Taft, whioh he expressed before the New Y01"k Convention of '~he Lea[,.'OO to 
Enforce Peace, sa;:ringr 
fh:is is not a partisan question ••• l{a should be for or agsi.."lSt 
the League, witl!out regard to whether 'we think it will bring credit 
to our partY' or cred1 t to any man. 
leaders was bearing fruit. The porfectly nattu~al doubt tlk'lt ~ Mool'ieans 
would have about the advisability at a new- departure ill foreign a.r.rail"'S lias 
11 .Q..~ss1onal ~o~, 66 Cong., 1 Seas., 1919, 791-2. 
was beir.g stirred into sometJling much more act! ve.12 
A poll of the press, published lr.{ the ltiter:a!l Disoot on April. 5. 
had shown that while the najority favored tl.te League as it stood, there was a 
very large body of opinion that would support conditional ratification. To 
the question, do you f 3,vor the proposed League of Nations? 718 newspapel'S had 
answered "Y cs", 181 "!~on' a.'1d 478 had. given conditional rer.e>liea. The likeli-
hood wu.s that the great lead L."ldicated for U'.te league could not be easily ""YW;' 
come, it at all. Hence th.e slowness with which the Foreign Relations Commit'tei 
If.Dved af."ter it received the treaty. The strength of the feeling against the 
League, and for it, on occasions of the President's connection with it, stood 
out clear~, as did the.feeling stirred up by the Senate attacks.JJ 
HeanwhUe the debate continued in t,he Je.rlate as to whether the pro-
posed Treaty of Peace should I:D published or not. President Wilson cabled in 
reply that he was unwilling to break his agreement with Allied leaders that 
the treaty be not published until 81.gned.14 Senator Borah countered, on 
June 9, by presenting a copy or the unsigned treaty, procured. for him by the 
Chic50 Tribune, and forcing its publica.tion. 
A rw da:t-s later the Senate investigating committee established 
that the oopy or t.he treaty seen by ,Hr. Lodge had passed from the hands of 
}ir. Thomas W. La.-nont, financial adviser at PariS, to ~.r. H. p. Davidson of 
12 ~., 899. 
13 "Do Iou Ft.vor the Proposed Lea~"Ue or Nations," Lit.er!,!I D:1,!st, 
New York, W, April 5, 1919, 13-l5. 
lh Baker, Woodrow Wilson .!!! !Jorld Settlement., I, 1$7-160. 
of J. P. Horgan and Compa1'l7, as head of the League of Red. Cross SoCieties, 
'Who in tum had passed it on to !o!r. Elihu Root. who had shawn it to Mr. Lodge. 
On June lO, Senator Knox introduced. one more resolution giving :n0-
tice to the Peace Conference that the treaty should be divorced from t.l1e 
Leat'Ue.16 The new resolution pushed. the assumption of the Sonate t s right to 
"advise" as tar as Senator Lodge himself' artel'WSl'd advanced it. The second 
paragraph of the 1" esolution warned against an assumed attempt to amend our 
constitution by passing the treaty', and the third expla.iMd with great care 
just how the Peace Conference could give the Senate a chance to vote on the 
Covenant separately. 
Here was a concession which many JiMIOVle would slq was going fe:J' 
enough. The obligation was whoJ.:q getleral and thus w .. absolutely nt>thir>-B 
taken and a stake in the world's peace recognized. It Wa:J going too tar ;or 
tor the Senate COOIIl1ttee on Foreign Relations however, Which reported the 
resoJ.ution witr~out the last paragraph conta1.rling this proposal. Even that 
inde£inite commitment was too much for Borah. Lodge and Borah understood one 
another.17 
Tart. reall~ed ful.l;r the trend of these maneuvers and at once pro-
tested against them as strongly as he could. He maintained that the \11101e 
15 "Opening of the 66th Congress," ClllTEfnt Hist0!Z1 New York, 
1919, I, ?t. 2, 54. .. • 
16 Csressional ~fJtlO~; 66th Congress, 1 Session, 1919, 894. 
11 pgngresslonal Reoord, 66th Congress, 1 Session, 1919, 14)0. 
attitude ot the Senat.ors was contrary to RepuQl1cans trad:1.tiona. 
Senator Xnax disclosed, however, on June 13, that be waUd tight 
1"01' his resolution to the end. He did not know which the Peace Conterence 
would tend toward, h18 ideas or his opponents, but at least the Senate b~ 
would be cleared of blame tor deltq .18 A close look at Senator's notes and 
Senator Knax:ts speech or June 11, in particular, would reveal the ~ objec-
Uvea to be time W arouse the country against th~ League and justificntion 
for taking it. Time to consider wu time to VJ.ea. 
So consuming was the Cabal's determination to thwart the President 
that no warnings would reach them. Thus Senator ficCumber appealed to them 
quite vainJ¥ on June lB, to take a long view, saying. 
SpaWN, you may defeat the treaty ••• But as surely as this 
18 defeated and the world au!'f'ers another calam1ty, deeper tban 
the hatred of the enetI\Y will be the hatred toward tb.e statesmen 
of the world. who ha.ve tailed in their great opportunity to league 
together to shield tbe poor, innocent beings trom such calamities 
as r.ave boon visited upon tJlem because there is no law to check a 
a great, powerful nation tram criminal aggression.19 
N either did the pleas or Wluential members of their party move 
them. The talk or a new round robin brought out the fact that a group or 
twenty-eight prau1nent Republ1cana, lawye~. bankers and others of New York 
Cit)r had protested to the Senate "that pol1t,ical partisanship should have no 
place in tl1e consideration on the merits or the Cansti tution ot t he proposed 
League of l~at.iona"' and urged ntbat the treaty and covenant be promp~ rati-
18 !L.!!!2!:! Times, June 13, 1919, pt. 1, p. 1. 
19 £OflS!!!si~ Record, 66th Cong., 1 Sess., 1919, 1266. 
fied. by the Senate without attempting to embaJ:.rass it by amendment." The ~ 
effect it produced was a vehement attack fI't'lm Senator Borah threatening that 
it the Republican Farty did not make a pe..rty issue or the League of nations 
a new party would be created to do so, while other senators ridicu.led the 
statement as coming from tt'the Taft Crowd.tt20 
The anti-leaguers had first pictured the League as dominated by 
the kingsJ then it had been the BritishJ a little later Senator Reed had. 
proved that we were likely to tall under the swq or the Negroes and other 
colored peoples J nOW' Senator Sheman pointed to the Pope as likely to control. 
the League. Were not twenty-tour of the forty Christian nations in the League 
"spir1t~ dclm1nated b'J the Vatican?" No broad field of prejudice was left 
uncultivated; nor were ~ smaller areas of rival antipathy overlooked.21 
B:r June 21, it bee .. evident that 'the Knox resolution could not 
be passed. On the same d.q fol'Jller Secretary Elihu Root appeared in the Senate 
wing of the Capit~. The result of a conference with his senator:Lal friends 
was a change of tactics. In a letter to Lodge he advised dealing with the 
de.fecta of the Covenant in a qualifying resolution of ratification. Atter 
commending the Covenant, at length as containing fta great deal of high value 
that the world ought not to lose" he advised (1) that consent to Article 10 
be rcf'used, (2) that no quali.tication on the right to withdraw be accepted 
and (3) that nothing in the Covenant "shall be construed. as to iMply a relln-
20 l!!! I2!:! Times, June 22, 1919, pt. 1, p. 1. 
21 CBDfFeuional. Record, 66th Cong., 1 Sess •• 1919, l4.37. 
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sition than he had enoountered 1n Paris. AS be embarked, a meeting in 
Carnegie Hall addressed by a Democrat and a. Republican, Senators Reed and 
Johnson, hissed his name and applauded a. man who shouted. that Wilson lms a. 
tra.1tor.26• 
. 
"tio human being, it seems," Si\Ys David Lawrence, who observed the 
President t.hrough the Peace Conference, "oould have SUl"Viveci the mental strain 
which rested upon Woodrow' Wilson d.uring the Pea.oe Conterence.n27 Now he had 
to tace the bitter opposition organised against him at home. 
The President's reception was as hearty as he could have wished. 
He was treated to all the pomp. the t{avy and officialdom could ofter, but "the 
greetings that seemed to mean most to him were the shouts m1 cheers or thou-
sonds or countr.vmen who lined the streets through which his automobile passed 
on the way to Carnegie Hall." The greatest demonstration in strength and vol-
ume came when be stood on the platform of Carnegie Hall and earnestly declared 
that the peace was "a just peace which, it it can be preserved, w1ll safe-
guard the world. from. unnecessary bloodshed.n28 
The sincerity of the President'a belief that the American people 
and all peoples everywhere wanted a better ordered world in which 't.here would 
be some safeguard against war has been little questioned, but he has been 
accused of not representing the Irish. The President bad not forced the in-
'26 Ibid., Ju.~e 29, 191.9, pt.. 1, p. 6. 
-
27 .Lawrence I !9!.!!:2! sto;rz .2! Wilson, 267. 
28 !!!!!2tii T~. July 11, 1919, pt. 1, p. 1. 
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dependence of Ireland and her admission to the .League. Irish nationalism 
might have been denied in Dublin and Paris .. but it was to have its day in New 
York and vJashington. rir. De Valera was acclaimed as ruler in tlew York two 
evenings after the Presidentts return by a crowd or twenty-five thousand. At 
this gathering there were hisses and boos at oach mention of the r,JillilO or the 
President of tile Un! ted States, t.he League of Nations, England and Sir Douglas 
Hmg. 
On July lo, the dq following his return the President laid the 
treaty before the Senate. The address which accompanied its presentation was 
an atterr.pt to explain the nature and necessity of' the basic setUements .. and 
of' the League in part.icular.29 The President's address, however, did not give 
the Republican Senators wrj llght. They had joined hea.rtJ.ly in applauding 
the President as he entered, but at the conclusion of' the message the Tribw18'1 
correspondent observed tbat three Republican Senators, McNary.. ~{cCumber aDd. 
Kenyon clapped mil~. In statements afterwards.. Senator Brandegee said, 
"Soap bubbles of orator.f and souffle of phrases." t-iost of' the Republican 
Senators tmi ted in deploring the the President did not answer any of t11e spe-
cific objections they bad agreed. to pross ~ainst the League. They felt that 
their spec1£lc attacks should have been reeof:;ni.aed by repqJ Wilson WaG de-
termined not to d1gn1.t'y the thing he wanted to avoid. 
After the President's address to the Senate, Republican leaders 
29 Ibid. 
-
5S 
• 
confeZTed in the cloak roan. "'those attending included Senators Lodge, Borah, 
Drandegee, Fall and HoCorndck.30 Further conterencea were held in rapid suc-
cession during the next few d~. Carter Field' s dispatch of July 12 atU'l0'Ul.lC:-
eel trult "Republican members of the Senate Foreign RelatiODS Committee dis-
cussed plans tor their fiCht on the peace treaty and the le&b'l'Ue of nations." 
Tbe next day be reported that the "Republican lines were consoli.dated in a 
dozen scattered conterences ••• at the houses ot various Senate leaders.u)2 
Senator Gore" Democrat ot Oklahoma, had visited Senator Lodge and announcad 
his adhesion to the reservation program so that the reservation1sts neM' had 
a majority in the Senate.,)' 
What would under natural and normal. circumstances haw been the 
opening speech in the entire debate on the treaty was made by Senator Swanson, 
of Virg1n1a, on July 14 J in a speech f'illing ten pages of the Record he 
attempted to analyze the essential features of the Covenant and the objections 
raised against it. The bl'\l&rantee by .Article 10 of territorial integrity a.rd. 
independence against external. aggression would act as a preventive ot war as 
it intended, not as a cause of' wars as critics maintained. What had. occurred 
under the Monroe Doctrine furnished convincing proof' of this contention. 
30 Ibid. 
-
31 Ibid. 
-
32 !!!! l2!! T1met!, Jul;v. 14, 1919, pt. 1, p. 1. 
33 u. S. Congress, Senate, C~onal ReCOrd~ 66th Cong., 
1 Sess., J~ 14, 1919, Vol. 58, pt. 3, ~on, 1919, 2 43-45. 
Swa."lSon stressed the deterrent power of Art1ol~ 10, and its detens1ve value 
to us, but maintained that its authority was moral" not. legal. 
The next d~ the Shantung settlement was brought to the fore as 
the iniquitous surrender of the great Chinese province to Japan, the Democrats 
replying that ~ property rif.hts had been eiven and tbat Japan would keep 
her proodse to hand political control to China. 
Senator Colt, Republican, of Rhode Island, spoke for the Leat,'Ue 
on Ju.ly 17, and said he could see no super state in the CovenantJ it was 
rather an association of tree nations. It asked no surrender of true nation-
alis:n When it substituted. a reign ot law for the reign ot force • .34 Senator 
Pan.el"ene ot Ohio, then defended the constitutionality of the league and re-
plied at length on the objections ~a1nst it.35 Senator McNary of Oregon, 
continued the defense OIl July 22, hold.i.ng that Article 10 was a moral bond, 
but the pillar section of the Covenant. The demwIld tor amendntent8 and res .... "; ... 
tions, he thought, came without proper reGard for the results t..'1at would 
tollav • .36 Senator Johnson at South Dakota, also could not see anytbing in 
Article 10 that was dangerous. Senator }loscs or l'Jew Hampshire could aee 
little th.at was good in the entire treaty.J? 
Senator NcKellar quostioned L~-ets attitude. Lodge bad been all 
2721-2. 
34 Co:.E!ssional Record, 66 Cong.,t 1 Sess., J~ 11, 1919, 
JS Ibid., 2927-85. 
-
J6 Ibid., 296$-88. 
-
37 Ibid., 2989-9.$. 
-
for allied harmony. now that th.e All1es had agreed upon the treaty and. the 
utmost harmony provaUed the onJ.y discoro,r.lut nO'1ie came .from Senator Lod.ge an.i 
his associates.38 The speaker tben ado-slted the tactics ot the opposition am 
viewed for the Covenant which hud ever been o.ffered. He cbara.c'tarized the 
resolution as an agreement ut.tw,t Europe cou.ld stir up all. t.b.a \1 ars ohe wanted 
to and we would be tbe police-men to stop them." wl1th no !aachinel)" to keep 
the peace provided, nit woul.d take 5' ,000,000 Arl1erican soldiers on guard in 
E.'urope all the time to keep order and the greatest navy in the world." l'tr. 
HcKellar a1med to outdo the alarmists .39 
After a speech in defense o£ the Shantung settlement by Senator 
Robinson ot Arka.'1SaB on July 24, 40 Senator Lenroot, o£ vi1sconsin, Sl:>oke tor 
reservations. He argued that since the Fourteen Po1nts had. not been ful.q 
compUed with we were Ullder no obligation to accept the Treaty as signed by 
the President. 'rhare was di.8agreement about the interpretations ot Article 
10 and two or three otJ'lers.. therefore reservations would have to be adopted 
to remove the doubts. lu. Zach reservation, held Senator Pittman .. of !~evada, 
on the same c:U.\Y, would have to be accepted by the trea.ty ratit'Jing power irl 
every state signatory to the treaty. MoreoVer, our exceptions would not stand 
alOOOJ other disappointed pOWe!"9 would press for the th.ing:3 they had not 01>-
38 Ibid., 2997. 
-
39 Ibid., 3022-32. 
-
40 ~., 3092-96. 
41 Ibid., 3~-90. 
-
. 
tained and the Senate WQ:lld have to accept their counter-reservations, dis-
tasteful though some of them would bo, J.f it got its own. It was better to 
reject the Treaty than to reopen contention. 
Senator Borah agreed at once allowing that all reservations to be 
agreed to by all signatories and granted tha.t legall\v Congress would retain, 
without arrJ' reservations, its r:S.ght to declare war. He was "not interested. 
in any form of interpretations or amendments or reservations.'" It was "either 
f'undamentaJ.l¥ right to enter this enterprise or fundamental.ly wrong." He 
thought it was wrong because it entangled us in European affairs and lessened. 
our independenoe, but if it was fundamentally right he would not waste his 
time with reference to t.'1e cbtails concerning it.42 
Mr. Borah spoke inunediatel\v after Senator Smith of Arizona, who 
had attacked the critics profession to be for a league, but not this one. 
- --
Why all the hypercritical interpretation of the terms of the cove-
nant he asked? The Honroe Doctrine was just as nru.ch a promise to make war as 
Article 10 was. It. would b A a silly threat if it was not; it was just that 
no one had. a.ttacked it as unconstitutional or c::>mplained that Congress was 
deprived of its freedom of' action under it. Moreover, our treaty with Panama 
bound us legally to maintain the independence of a foreign state. Yet the 
great mass of busy Amerioans was l:eing disturbed by the oft repeated charge 
that the covenant must be defeated or qualified because it violated the 
-
42 Ibid., 3141-45. 
-
palladiuro. or their liberties. The impression 'Was being created that all bur-
dens fell on us alone, whereas eve:r:y member of the league was nrJ.tu~ rea 
sponsible.4.3 
Senator Walsh, of r'iontana, on July 28, emphasized. the peraistent 
ignoring of the phrase "as against external aggression" in Article 10. He 
denied the assumption that the right. of revolution was infringed and challeng-
ed anyone to show where armed force for the :reeing of Ireland or Shantung was 
to come from. History afforded so few examples oJ: states WlSell'1sb~ inter-
vening in behalf of rebels fighting for freedom tha.t our intervention in Cuba. 
had. been proclaillled as absolutel;y unique in that respect, and yet we catI'.Ie out 
of the war with Porto Rico and fue Philippines. 
"It is worthy of remark that those who most s tautly assail this 
fea.ture or the Covenant avow wi tb equal vehemence and insistence that we lilUBt 
keep out of the quarrels of Europe." It is plain that the Irish could expect 
no armies from the United States, even if' the opponents of the Covenant won. 
Hei ther could they expect them from impotent Germany or f'J'lgland I s ally France 
or illiberal and woak Spain. France and s,l:.Iain had tried repeatedly in gen-
eral wars to free the Irish but had. never succeeded. Irelanc1' s freedom did. 
not lay in the armed force of other nations. 
But the League did offer hope ot Irish independence by enabling 
through Article II any friendly power to bring Irela.-xl's oause before the 
Lea.gue tor discusoion and through Article 10 by removing the supposed military 
4J Ibid.. .31.3S. 
-
menace in a free Ireland which England alw~ professed to fear. 
The case of Shantl.lllg offered a sL'11ilar situation. Article 10 had 
also been condemned as perpetuating the Shantung settlement. This settlement 
was condemned as part. or a campaign to deteat the League because, it vas 
maintained, the President agreed. to it to save the League. 
That was what hurt. "Wilson saved. the Leag'Ue by giving Shantung 
to the Japa·- expressed equally, malice toward the builder end his creation. 
yet, again, how was China to be helped by defeating Article 101 What nation 
was going to send armies and navies to take Shantung away from Japan? Yet 
Article 10 o.ftered China a guarantee against furt:.her aggreSSion which she had 
sadl.y needed for a century and certainly needed stlU~ 
Article 10 was the "soul and. spirit or the Covenant" said Mr. 
Walsh. That was why- those who Wished to deteat the wnole plan desired to 
emasculate it. They said American boya would have to tight 10 tbis or that 
hypothetical war, forgetting to say that if this Val' took: place some boys 
from every other quarter or the globe would bave to go too. Senators lost 
sight or. the deterrent effect of' tile Article even while extolling the tJIonroe 
Doctrine. How bad the Doctrine preserved peace except by the promise to pun-
isb aggression? There were only two ways to maintain peace--ei ther by agree-
menta such as thts or by actually establishing an international. police force 
equal to the job.44 
4U Cffiireseional Record, 66 Cong., 1 Seas., 1919, .3222-28. 
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Senator Williams then < applied the dpctrine of the free and un-
trammelled choice to the units within a state. Suppose each citizen or each 
state in the union said, ttl am ~ own sovereit,'11, responsible to nobody' but 
God, and at t he right time I will do the right thing, and I want to be .free 
to say when I shall do it and \-There I shall do it and hm-r I shall do it.1t 
Could you get civilization within the nation this wa;y? 
The assumption that it was human nature to fight and you could not 
change human nature, was a stupid, barbarous utterance, sald 111'. \-lilliams, as 
if human nature had not changed from the day our ancestors drank mead out of 
skulls of their enemies. Human beings were fallible-but why gaze so in-
tently at the specks on the rising sun of the Covenant that you failed to see 
the s un itself,45 
Another Democratic Senator, ~x. Thomas, of Colorado, delivered a 
long considered speech the next day in which he held that morality was static 
and human nature unchanging. Internationalism would be a menace if racial in-
stincts didn't make it unattainable. 
He was followed by the venerable Senator Nelson, Republican of 
Minnesota, who thought the entangling allicmce agreement came entirely too 
late. The Senator favored s orne reservations because doubt and controversy 
had arisen but he had not It groped around to find objections to defeat the 
treatY" for he was imbued with the faith that fundamentally the general. pur-
45 Ibid., 3230-35. 
-
pose of the LeaGue was sound and fully WUXTanted.46 
Senator Hansdall .. of LO"..u.siana, tilOfl reviewed the proeressively 
rising costs and destructiveness of war and Senator OWen llnked the Monroe 
Doctrine and the Covenant togethor as common in purpose and as mutually 
strengthening each other.47 
But all the arguments made in the Senate did not advance ratifica-
tion. Republican Senators had been generally pledged to a pOlicy of reserva-
tions or rejections, with an \Ulderstanding that reservations would be thus 
&lsureci, and the President was not ready to accept reservations, though Mr. 
T aft was by this time conv.lnced that the '.['reaty could not be rat1fied \d.thout 
them.uS 
The i:eginning of August brought evidence of strength in botb the 
irreconcilable and mild reservationists camps. A group of seven Republican 
Senators agreed to support. a draft of reservations covering withdrawal, 
Article 10 .. danestic questions and the 11onroe Doctrine. The Senators who 
sponsored these mild reservations were, l~eNary, Oregon; McCumber, North 
Dakota; Colt, Rhode Island; Spenser, Hissouri;Cummins, Iowa; Kellogg, 
i'1innesotaJ and Lenroot, Wisconsin---,eJ) rie.tamers except one. They did not 
present their reservations to ~tr. Lodge tor approval, but were in negotiation 
with Administration leaders. Their purpose was to hold a balance of power 
46 Ibid., 3320-23. 
-
47 Ibid., 3397-3404. 
-
48 Ibid., 3230-35. 
-
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that would oompel one or both of the other groups to modify lts position. 
Which group would accept InOd.i£ioation would be interesting to see. 49 
The ohance of agreement with the ratifioation group seemed but. for 
relatively few, the best, for the irreconoilables were inoreasing st.eadi~ 
the s cope of their attacks. Senator Borah, was satisfied with the reaults of 
shooting at Artiole 10 and was now bringing Artiole 11 under fire. The lrra-
oonoilables, however, were in a per.t"eot position for future offensive, due 
to their control of the Senate Forelgn Relations Cornm1ttee.SO 
By the end of July the Senate Foreign Relations Cam twa had fin-
ished forma.lly reading the 'l'reaty line by line. The Committee then prooeed.ed 
to bold a serles of hearings at which all the available Amerioans of import-
ance who had been attached. to the American Peace Commission W8re examined. 
These gentlemen, together with written replies tram the President, convinced. 
the OOlrlld.ttee that th,ey were not to have acoess to &13 detailed records of the 
Peace Conference that indicated bow many disputed points had been settled 
there. They got an opinion from Nr. Lansing that the President need not have 
yielded on I;)hantung, but the ea.r~ hearings HeJ"e not very productive.51 So, 
atter they had axamined everybody who might, have enlightened them, except 
Colonel House who was :t.ill in Parls, they decided to qUestia.l the Prosident 
publicly 1£ he 'Would consent. He agreed, and, on August 19, the session 'Was 
49 New Ynrk TL"'ieS, SatUl'day, A'l€.'USt 2, 1919, pt. 1, v.7. 
__ •....., ......... J T 
$0 Ibid., Tuesdq, August 5, 1919, pt. 1, p. 1. 
-
51 U. S. Congress, Senate Document lC6, 66th COfl~., 1st Seas., 
Vol. 10, Wednesday, August 6, 1'19, wui"iIiiiton, 1919, 14$06. 
held in the 'White House while., group of stenographers reltqed. the proceed1nga, 
to a large gathering of newspape1"Jllfm in the basement. 
The conference lasted three and a halt hours with the discussion 
covering a wide range of su.bj acta bu.t turning generalq around the obl.1ga-
t10ll8 in Article 10. The President maintained throughout that tJle guarantee 
lWas moral not legal. A legal obligation 8pac1fic~ bouncl you. to dO a par-
ticular thing lUlder penalty. Such an obl1ga.Uon could not exist bet.ween sov-
ereign states. A BlOral obligation 1188 indeed. superior to a legal obligation 
and even more binding, but it always inTolYed the right to eDreise ju4gment 
and decide whether under the circumstances the obligation applied and called 
for action. This discretion remained in Congress and could not be taken aW.,. 
The results were J!lUch as usual. It A careful camus of the coadt-
tee on the return of the Senators to theirotfices showed an absolutely UJa-
changed alignment. The President did not convince any Senators who are oppos-
ed to the league or treaty, or any of those who want resenations." But, it 
seemed that he inspired thoselho favored ratificaUon without ohange with 
more enthusiasm.$2 
A few days later the Committee voted, 9-8, to amend the Treaty 
directly to put Japan out of Shantung. On the same dq, August 2), it adopt.-
ed fifty amendments designed to rem.oV8 the .Amerioan members from. ne .. l,y all 
of the uommisaions set up to enforce the weaty. 
Then in answer to the President'. plea for a report on the treaty 
6S 
.. 
it opened "the Alaerican Oonference- and proc~ed to hear the gr.i.8V'ImCes of 
ever,y group of people disappointed at the Peace Conference who oare4 to appear 
befont it. The EQp1;ians led otf, followed b1 the Irish, Li1;huaniana. 
Latvians, Esthomans, Negro Americans, Hungarians, AJ..banians, Jugo Slavs and 
Ital.1ans. Ma.D;r of the delegations were •• U.appoint.ed, but the Oa.mt1ttee 
list.eDed gra'Vely and sympatJlet.lcally to their troubles, as it it could. do 
something tor them. Most of the. vere American citizens and voters. No sus-
picion of hyphenation was lodged against th-.53 
As thia program got well under wq the President, made his final d. ... 
cision, at the close of August, to appeal in person to the people of the Wes1; 
who had elected hila. 
, 
In the meantime, the speech Making had continued. in the Senat.. 
senator Fall, of New MexiCO, rerdnded. the senate that this idea ot a milleD-
nium was rather old and protested that it we joined. the League we would not 
onl.3 destroy the government of our fathers, but, cOlrmdt a ·cri_ against the 
nations of the earth, against civilization itselt •••• " Senator Sterling, on 
the 4th, suggested. that the clause requiring the fultillJnant of obligations 
be.rore withdrawal would make departures tr~ the League impoaslble. Senator 
Watson, ot Indiana, attacked. Japan f8 record. at length. Senator lellogg, de-
fended t.he constitutionality ot League lIt'Dbership, at the same ti1lle pleading 
for reservation. 
On August 12, Senator Lodge delivered his first prepared attack 
SJ U. S. Congress, Senate, CRS10nal Recont, 66th Cong., 1st 
SesSion, Tuesday, August 12, 1919. Vol. ~. 4, gu1iIng'Eon, 1919, .3778-.318l 
atter the submission of the treaty. He began wi t.h the preamble of the 
Covenant. "'Brave words, indeed,'" !hen he discovered that Article .3 a.ct.u~ 
gave the league the right to interfere in the internal contlict ot its ma-
bers to "'deal with" an;r matter af'tecting the peace of the world. Be could 
see no distinction whatever between legal and moral. obligations in connection 
with Artic~e 10. We might well have to whip China in Shantifmg. .And. 11' Xing 
Hussien ot Hedju., then attacked by the Bedouins. appealed to u tor aid we 
would be bound to send American troops to Arabia. There would be no escape 
except by- breach of faith. And there was no d.oubt whatever in his mind that 
other nations might order American ships and troops to ar17 part of the world.. 
This must not be. It must be made perfectly clear that not even a corporal t. 
guard could ever be ordered qvhere except by the constitutional author:l.t7 of 
the Un! ted States .54 
Senator Nugent, Democrat of Idaho, speaking on August 25, knew of 
no reason why a distinction should be draWh between the "sovereign right. of 
a nation to plunder its weaker neighbors and the -right of an indt YiduaJ. to 
do 410."1 Moreover. whatever sovereign rights we lost would be lost by other 
mambers wo, so we would be in the same relative position. The "1Sove:reign 
right" to declare war exactly when it pleased. us had been given up alre~ in 
the twenty-eight Bryan peace treaties ratified by the senate .5S 
54 Ibid., 3781-84. 
-
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Senator Knox clOlecl the August debates by d.eclaring himself opposed 
to the whole treaty. He had. held. a conference of ilTeccmcilable senatore OIl 
A~ 21, a week before the President r~ announced. hie decision to CO 
before the count,rr, at which plans were IIIde tor a apeald.ng 1;our of Senat.Ol"8 
in the Weet designed. to l:ring about. the cOJUpl.ete defeat. or the League.56 
Wilson then decided to appeal to the people to 8tpport him. He 
was conv:1.need. that the :masses voulcl rall.y 0IlC8 more, and an organised and 
overwhel.m:tng public opinion would. torce the Spate to act. p~ and favor-
ably. 
Wilson undertook the arQuoua journe;y against the aiv1ce of I>h7si-
cians and frlenda. His health bad never been robust" and he was now veak and. 
trembling. Six years .. Chief' kecutive, with the lnterno of a World War and 
the madhouse or a Peace Cocterence thrown in, had taken its toll. The 
Republican opposition at hOJlle, to 81!1?1 nothing of oppressing domestic probl .. 
and . the heat ot washington had sapped his strength.57 The President kn_ he 
was taldng a grave chance" however, hesLid. h. would be glacl to give his lir. 
tor the cause.58 
The President set out from Washington on September 3. A.tt.er speak. 
ing in Ohio and Indiana, he passed on to the trans-MiSsissippi Meddle Wes't. 
His reception here, though enthusiastio, were not all that his Mends might 
56 . C2!!fF!!!ional RecOlld, 66th Cong • .t 1 Sess., 1919, 4493-4,0l. 
57 Ed.ith Bolling Wilson, Memoir, Inc11anapolia, 1939, 274. 
58 T\maulty, Wilson !! 1. ltnfiiW Him, 4.3S. 
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have desired. Already axl'l&usted he did not ha.ve time to prepare :b..is speeches 
proparly. He ma.de some palpable errors of tact, and. he so tar lost his cus-
tomary dignity as to challenge his adversaries to ttput up or shut. up.lt> He Vd 
also under the handicap or placing the best possible interpretation on wa:t; 
he knew was an iropertect trea.ty. aut. when WUson reached !-1ontana. and Idaho 
he was welcomed vi th demonst.rations that were vell-..'ligh unbelievable. 
Washington" Oregon and Oilltornia warmed to the president.59 The climax of 
the Presidentts sojourn in Los Angeles came when lJman J. Gage, Seoretary of 
the treasur-I in President. Mcf.inley's cabinet, said to !rlJn, ttl think I express 
the sentillent of the great mass ot the people when I sq 'God bless President 
liilson. Go on With the work. taW 
Disturbec:l by the reception that Wilson was receiving, Bewral ot 
the":1rreconcilable'l: senators, notabq Borah of Idaho and. Johnson o! Cali.forni~ 
carried through plans to Ittrail" the :'residant, speaking in aom.e of the same 
cities a little later on the other aide ot t.i.e subject. As orators they were 
nntch better tl,a..'l the President in speaking to immense audiences and better 
able to play on the emotiQ!l8 of the masses. Johnson was so grateful o€;cause 
ot the response he received that he begged!or more delay, saying, ull ve 
could just get sixty days before the final date the American people would make 
thtlir desires know in such u.mrr1stakable tams that nothing 'Would be lett of 
this treat.,. •• 61 
• 
S9 !!!!2!! tim., Sept. 18, 1919. 
60 ~., Sept. 19, 1919. 
61 Ibid.. 
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CHAPTER IV • 
RESEt1VAT!ONS TO THE TImA1'Y 
.. 
UteI' the President.s trip was well started 1.he senate Foreign 
Relations COIlmlittee brought in its report, on September 10. The report of 6-
Republican MJorlty-a. bitterly partisan dool.ll!leDt--propoaed tort;y-tive 
amendmentl and tour reservations. Alter prolonged clebate, the amend.ment8 
were rejected on t.be ground tbat the entire 'eace Conference would. have to be 
reconvened. to aak. thea valid. Instead, the Senatre by an abIost solid 
Republ1can vote added :f'ourt.een so-called Lodge reservations. Thea. were oat.. 
aib13 designed to release 'the United States trom certain entanglements, and to 
safeguard. Aaerican 1nst1tutions and historic poliCies inCluding the Monroe 
Doctrine.1 
Wilson had expreaaed .. willingness to accept mUd reaerY'ationa 
but be balked at those or Senator Lodge, particularq the one that struck at 
Article 10, "the heart of the Ocmman\.· The Pnt81dent tel:t., not without 
,reaaoa, that 11 be ab.oui1d oonsent to the Senat.G reservations, the opposition 
voulcl add others that he could not accept. He alao believed that 1#he SenaW 
would cmm.tual.ly be toreed into 11M beoause -the altemat.1 ve o£ going back 
to 0el"JlWV" to negotiate a new \rea"". would be -too abBurd.1t' At this oru.c1al 
...m, Wilson wrote a letter to hia lo7al Democrat1c following, 
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• • • In I\Y opinion • • • 1\he LodgeresolutiOD d.oe8 not. pro-
vide tor rat1f'1cation but rather. tor the mJJlificat10n or the 
t.re&t7. I aincerel7 hope that 1ibe frlend8 and supporters of the 
\reaV v1ll vote against the Lodge resolution oi ratiticaUOD. 
I underatanct that the door will probably then be opeD tor 
a. genuine resolution of rAtification. 
I trust that all tN. friends o! the treatT will refuse to 
support the Lod&e resolution.2 
The crucial vot.e Wa3 take on tne next Qq, November 19, 1919. The 
treaty with the fourteen reaerv&tiona, Wda de!eatad b,y a vote of 39",feas to SS 
na.ya. The;yeas consisted of thirtj"-tive ltreservaUOIli.st8u. Republicana and 
four De.~taJ t.he na;ya oonsisted or thirteen "irreconcllable" Republicans, 
together 'With the oVEIl"II,helming majority or the Democrats, fort.y.two altogether 
who loy~ followed their fallen lead.er18 requeet.. S1noe theae Democratio 
vo\es defeated the treaty with resarYat1ona, it might be saiet that. 'WilBon b.i1I-
selt kept tho United States ou.t of t.be League of Nationu. 
The RepubUc81l8 rejoiced., but 1;he t.reai;.y' was not dead. Under the 
lash or a strong public reaction the Senate voted. to recona1der its dec1aion, 
and on Februu-y 16, 1920, the debate was resumed. The treaty came to a 'VOte 
on March 19, 1920. There were otten disouaai0n8 which Decaae beated.. There 
were tU'teen reservat.ions this ti.me--one had been added in favor oL Irish 
independence" A8 betore, Wllaon wrote a letter to the rudderleaa Dem.ocrata 
in the Senate expressing h:ia desire tha.t the treatv with reservations be 1"0-
j ected. He insisted, 
-
2 OogE!!81onal Record, 66th Oong., lst Sese., 1919, 8768 • 
.3 ·The Rejection or the Treaty.,It. Lit.er!!Z Digest. New York, 
Inn, Nov. 29, 1919. l.l. 
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E1 tiler we should enter the J.ea&ue taarlesa13 t. accepting the 
nspansib1l1 ty am not tearing the role of leadersm.p which we now 
enjoy I contributing our efforts towards establishing a just and per-
manent peace, or we should retire as graee1'ully as possible from 
the great ooncert ot powers by which the world was N."I'fJd..4 
The Democrats in complying Vith the President's request apparently 
believed that after a complete deadlock had been established by the two Yo1;ee; 
\lpOQ rat1tlcation a set ot cOIIpromise reservatJ.ons acoeptable to both aidd, 
would be worked out. The hope proved vain at the olose ot the .ession, but 
the daIIandB tor a compromise were so strong in the count17 that an unofficial. 
OOJlO1l1ation comm1tt.ee vas constituted. after the holidays oonsisting of tMo 
Republlcans regulars, Sena~l'S Lodge and New, two middle grounders'. Kellogg 
and Lenroot and £1 ve Democrats. The irreconc1lables were not dil"eOtly re.l)re-
sented, but at the crucial moments, When the group seemed. about to agree on a 
:resenation. to Article 10, Senators Lodge and New went into conference with 
thea and progress ceased} 
The President, in thiS, remained opposed to altering the Treat,. 
and 11M 80 convinced that the oou.nt.17 thought likewise that he wrote the 
Jackscm Dq Diners on January 8, urging a great and. solea referendum em the 
subject. of the cQling elect.ion. 
W. cannot rewri'tie tb1a treaty. We mu.st take it without change 
1Ib1ch alter its meaning, or lea.,. it, and then, atter the rest of 
the world baa signed. it, we 1lWI' .face the uuthinkable task of ma1d.ng 
cother and separate kind or treaty 'With Gemany.6 
h CO!!fP"!!sional Record, 66 Cong., 2 Seas., 1920, 402$. 
S !!! I2!:!s "btea... Janu.ary 18, 1920. 
6 Shaw, MeasyetS !!!! P!£!!! P.! Woodrow Wllie, II, U6). 
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!bia proepec1; did not. appeal to th! people 1D ,enera1, bu\ 1\ cl14 
DO\ flPP4l. the Republ1can 1ea4era, nor d1cl the 1clea of 1ft appeal to the people 
arouae 8Il\hu1Ma amons the DeaaooraUo cb1eta. fileT had al.reacV bad. too .. 
4I'f1d.eftce or \be hoa\1l1t.7 of the Ir1ah, Qerun and. Ital1an "1"8 to \he 
Leap.e and WIrard. ita maker. Oibel- poeat, leadere, too 'Ul"Ie4 su1:mt1ulcm to 
tJae Lodp procr-. Hr. Brrm coumJellecl uceptance 8 troDil1', and lm'd Gr., 
after a period .. Brit.1ah AJsbuaador, adviae4 l1k1Jld..ae.7 
lbe ....... Uou Oftl" which \han v .. 8UOh a oCllpleu ta.1.l.uft to 
ga1Q aar .......... 8t111 ~ to s .. J1iIiOe.8ary 01' .upertluwa aooorcl1D& to 
the politioal or tempel"'U&8Dtal Yiewpo1ntot the......... that \be.r bet_ 
pol1tloalll' l1tICeI'al7 t.o \he rat1t1caU. ot the __ • oannot be queat,1011e1l. 
the t1rat reaerrat10n d.ealt. 1d.\b v1t.hdrawal. fh1J aw.".UOIl 
1Iade 1\ oert.a1a that. in 0._ the UD1W ata_ bee_ unc<8f'onable 1ft t.he 
La ... no technical objec1;101l1 8houlel !apiIde her a1t. The tfNll' of nch • 
pred1oaaen\ • ., pecul1a:r \0 the AIIer10an ob3~ to \he Leape ancl. in spite 
of the1r long tJIIIpbu1a upOD the neceel1t7 of • olear path to the rear, no 
~ 00\UlW7, ~an or .AMri.caa, aoqu1re4 their appZ'8heD810D1. 
!be Preal4ent, •• ob3eo\1ou tow. ftS ... tlGa were 1Irba'\ it. 
, __ to OOD&Nl8 the riPt to 1;ake 111·.' of trhe Lupe 'tv' ..... 
~~QIl, that. 11. by a bee...,orl.t.7 .. ad v1tharlt 
ld.8 ~. 
!be aeoonc.t and moet, blt.~17 ~ rea ..... Uon d1aa.Towecl ., 
obl1pt.1cm to be 1itolmc1 by ""tole 10, an4 other p..... of tbe Oat'eDal'lt, uraleea· 
7 !!! tor1&: U!!t!- Jem&a17 l2, 192O. 
8 O~OM1 Reoorcl. 66 OOlllNl8, 2 a_ion, 192O, 32L1. 
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• future C0DgJ'888 8hoW.d us .. the oblip.tio~ at. the t:I..M. Acoord1ng to one 
tac\1on t.h1a NMJ'Yation " .. Y1~ .... 1Q7 to preserve OU" ~ and. 
tull7.atep.ard it_ the reaervaUon rea4, 
!be Un1te4 st&tee Mauaea no obligation to pl"88ene the tem.-
Wr1al intear1v or polit1oal ~ of 8IJ7 other count.r.Y or 
to 1Dt.erten in contrcwes'8iea  DaUona........wb.ether JIeIIbeJ:'8 of 
the Leape or not-'lJIId.w the pron.a1ona of Art10le 10, or to _lo7 
'the lI1l1twy or Daftl. toreea of ~ l1Dit.ed Statea under .,. uUol. 
of the tna\7 tor aD7 purpose, unleaa 111 ar:t;f part.1cu.l.&r case the 
C0lDglWI8, which, \U'1der the C01'l8U1Ntdoa, has the sol- power to de-
olare WV 01" autbori_ the -.pl.o.Ji8lI\ of the m1l1tar,y or DaYal. 
foro. of the United. Stat-ea, ahall by 80\ or jQ'1nt Nlol.utA.oo 80 
pl"OYide.9 
!h4I Wrd rea8l'YllUon pl"OV1.dld \hat, no undat.e OftI' 8fII' of the oca-
cp.enc1 terr1W1"1ee 8houl4 be aoepk4 bT the UD1W States without act.1on of 
Coupoes8, • ~ which vaa, aca1D, aee4lea. OJ' urcentll' requ1red. aeOOl'tl-
1DI to the attitude held toward the Prestdcq aal eapeo1al.l¥ "'*aJ'd. the 
Pres1da\ of the 1d.at. It would. 0Dl.7 be • nail Prea14eDt, :S.DdMd Who voalcl 
atWilpt to • __ on b1a own -~\7 n. a napouaibllit7 tor the c oua1iI7. 
one that he could bardl7 ainta1a 1_ v1thoat &Cu. of COIlp"888. the tiDal 
YOte CII1 the ol.awJe .. on 'ebna:t7 26, ... 68 to 14.10 
I'a1.ler tour wamed the J:,eaaue .. ., f'rca 1n\erleren.ce nth our d.o-
Jl8lftJ.o attaire or with 81J7 cone.,. that, _zoe even ~ c1aJaea'Uo. .bloIlC 
the titt,.-aeYeJ1 atatea who jo1Ded the Leape DO single ODe bee_ a1ana4 
aboIlt, 1ntertereDOe with ita dClle8td.c atta1r8. fhe7 were jut, u jealole of 
their 4caeR1c 1Dtecr1t,. tooo, .. we cOlll4 be-• ...ancl1lalV' of them. a hundred. 
9 n-inc, United State8 e l:!!! Iee!. 4l8. 
10 C5!!£!!!lonal Reoorcl, 66 Cong., 2 SeI._, 1920, 3S14. 
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u.s lese able to p~ 1f, 111 cue of~. yet when the pos.s.-
. 
b1l1V va held h1gh in the Sel'J&t;e 1t ...... 4 unreasonable ~ to to:reatall it., 
~~ Vlum 1\ VGUl4 al.Mp cc.e d.<:Im w the plauible 1na1llt.enoe, .. It 
the lAque does not __ ~ <10 tbe8e tbinaa, 1t ~ woa't do aDI' ha:ra to 
..,. 80.· !hentore the Seaa\e ~ S6 to 2S .. JfaNh 2, 10 tawr of the 
aboYe MDUone4 .... enat.ton}l 
JUll .. bas po1Dtecl out 111 h1a peD1IVatinc 1D&l.p1a of the ru ...... 
t10D11 that, .... rnt1.on 10. h 18 1og1oal.l1' 1ndetena1ble. It a question zoe-
~ ldtI ·ill part.! to 1ntema1 afta1N, .at. l' DOt J'elat,e also to toreip 
atta:Ln to ........ , !be .-.td._111 OODOlu1~ arunrered. bT the tact. 
that the Urd.W Sktea baa ~ ratU1ec1 tNaUes nplat.1Dc all ..... of 
the .ubj ................. ' 18 the Nlern.t1on.12 
the R1~ Nlenat1ca _ w..td.o qw.esUou _t.pte4 to fKmU' 
the nb3"' in ...... ~ Nt at ~" aml1D lea. ott .. 1 .... ~ .. 
tollowl. 
that n.o ..... ut.1on 18 requ1re4 to nba1t to the League, ita: 
COtJnOi1, or 1ta AU_lI', tor 4eo1IJ101l, ~, or ~~f 
., _ter ¥h1ch l' o0B81d.en t.o be ia SMemaUona1 l.a1r a dClll8uo 
question, such u ~on, la'bol-, t.r1ttJ. or ot.her _'Wr reo-
la14Dc to ita 1Dtemal orcou~ attalN.J.J 
!he SeDat.e'. :rMaaert.1Qll of t.be 1Dri.o1ab1l1t,..- land. Ulb11U1.-
of the Mouoe llootIiDe Jd&bf, alao ha .... been. .al.lowerl to pus at that time • 
. , 
u ~., 311a.. 
12 David H1.ul't.&r lUller, .It !!!!!% at the OODtennce of Pari., .. 
York, 1926, S??-S80. - - · -
lJ 0!Y!'!P1oaal. Ieooe. 66 0 __ , 1 Sea •• , 1919, 8800. 
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It would hU;lTe not been an occasion tor surprise however, it SOl'l18 Latin CO\IDJoo 
. 
tl')" had telt it a good opportunity to disavow our hegemony over this hemi-
sphere and to maintain that since the assertion of the Doctl"ine's validity in 
definition of the Doctrino and s orne limitatio.ns of our yl"eten&ion under it. 
The fUth reservation informed the members ot the Lea€;'Uo that. 
The United States 'lIdll not submit to k'l. rb1tration or to in-
qlliry by the Assembly or by the Council of the League of Nations, 
provided for in sro..d treaty of peace, ;;,ny questio,ns }lhich in the judcment of the United States depend upon or relate to long es-
tablished. policy, c01'JJmOl1ly known as the Monroe Doctrinel said d0c-
trine is to be interpreted by t.b.e Ullited States alone and is here-
by declared. to be who~ outside the jurisdiction of said l.eag;ue 
of Nations and entirel,r une.t£eotecl by at\'Y provision contained in 
the aaid treaty of peace with 0e1'l!lallY. 
~'he long attack upon the Shantung Bettlement and upon Japan's mo-
t1 VEla came to an end with the a doption of tbe comparati~ mild statement 
that "The United States witholds ita assent to Articles 156, 157 and 158, and 
receives full liberty of action with respect to any controversy which may 
ariae under said articles ._14 
'W'hether the Japanese government of the d 8.y would have been toler-
ant and s trent:. enough to have aaaented to ~ entry into the League under this 
condit.ion can neva%' be known. The pride of the Japanese people had been 
deeply hurt by the rejection of t.heir racial eq;uali ty declaration ~J the 
Peace Conf'erence and this r eel.1ng had not been all.a.yed by the sustained ettoJ"t, 
ot th~ Anse..."'ica1'l Senators to bold up their succession to the Geman property in 
14 C~sional Record, 66 Gong., 1 Seas., ~19j 8794. 
77 
China u an a:ampl. of the aros- 1aoral1Uu· pexpetratecl 1D the t:rea.. Po-
lit1c.l neceaa1v, it I1Otb1Jla aore, .., well haft lecl the Japmeae GovenJ.ment 
to 1"flh8. \0 .. 8. th1a resenaUon.15 
!he ~ l"eServa\1011 '1188 des1ped to preYeD' 8l\V' American tl'Oll 
aen1na e1iheJo officially or unott1c1al.l7 1lpoa arJ7 boc17 set up br \he fl'eU1' 
or League ua.leaa author1aed by CongresB to do 80. the e1&htb claimed for that. 
bodT .. right to OYerrule the 1lepvation C0IIIJd.881on on owtain cont1DpDo1 •• 
fbe ninth Wol"lll8d. the lAaaae that CoDgreu would have to pan upoa Iltt¥ of 1_ 
expens_ att.l'ibuted t.o WI. two of theae deolarat1ona Il&7 have ·beeJl eaa113 
OTel"looked. b.r the poY'8I"8, but \he pr1nc1pal A1l1_ would haw bad cause t.o 
JIIea11;.aw before g1T.lng our Conareas a veto 0'9'f'.r one at \he moat ~ 
powve of the Reparation Gcad.8s1on.16 
!he tenth prov.181on sought to make 81ll"8 that the ancient right of 
selt del... ... not abo11ahecl aDd. that CGQgIWJ8 1ld.ght approve mv iUW n-
ductioo, whUe the eleYeftth quieted the professed tears of Senatore, that the 
eOOl1<111o boyoott applied. to a ccmmant breald.ng state II1ght 1:At extea.ded to ita 
clti_ 11T.tDg 1D other CCNIltriea. 10 posa1b1l1ty, hoveYer :ramo'-, of tutun 
~ b7 the League w. 'Wng overl.oolced· b;y the 1"OIIen'&t1on1ata az:td no .... ,r,.-
tu.rd.t;y to .nc.tl.7 defend the rJ.ghta ot the .A.lae.J'ioana •• p_sed by. fil11a \be 
Wel.ttII nsern.t1on dealing with two &l"t1clee of the trea'by which provided £01' 
the lJ.qu1dat,i0ll of debts betweeft oiU ... at tJle e1pat017 artaMa forbade the 
15 Miller,!t AA!a!!.!!l! Conteraqc~.2£ Para, sa). 
16 ne1U!, UDi~!":*'M.!!!!:!! h!!ee, 1&26.428. 
constru.ction or thee. art.lo1ea into ~ "otberv.1se Illegal or in e+:mtr.. 
'¥'eDt1on ot tbe rights or citiaena of the United States." 
The th1rte.l1:h clause or the proposed resolution of ratification 
looked vi ttl auspiolon on the Internationa1 lAbor Organ1zat10D and. procl.a:1.me4 
ODce more the right of Congress to regulate our cO'ldng and going in the teaeue 
It .delt 
the United Statel v1thold8 its.. . anent. to Part. XIII, ~!,iclea )87-b27, 1n.ol.,1ye, UDleaa Qongraa b.r aft or Jo1Dt l'88OlU.UOD 8ha1l 
~ make prov18ion tor representaticmin the organization eatab-
llaW'IV sai4 Part. XIII, ad in nob ftY8Ilt, the part1cipat.101l of t1:ut 
Un! ted States wiU be governed aM conditioned b,y the pravi.lons of 
such act or joint :N8olut1oa.17 
fhe sU8ta1neci cautpaign to oomrinoe HOtiou of \he A1Ier1om people 
'tba\ the l.eagu.e would be controlled. b.Y Great, Br.I.taiD ended 1D tJle c1eclaratia 
tba"t 
Until Part I, belu& the OO'ftD&Qt of the Le ......... at .at1ou, 
aball be 80 aMnded as to provide that \be 11n1 ted States shall be 
entItled to cast It. numbel' o£ VOMs equ.ad to that which alii member 
or th$ League and. ita aelt-eOYel"ft1.ng doa1ni01'l8, coloni., or parts 
of empiru, in the ~:1"eiate shall be eutJ.tled. to cut, the United 
States 88SUUS no obligation to be bound. by tJZ11' election, decision, 
report or t1nd1.ng of the OOWlOil or AaBalblJ 1n wh1ch &rI,1 ID8IabeI' 0: 
the teague ano. ita lIelt..govem1:ng dominions, colonies or parts ot 
eaapire 1D. the 8I&l"8pte haye cut, more thm one vote •••••• 
The United St&t8a uaumee no obligation to be bound 1>7 8.tV' 
cieo181oD, report or ~ n4:! III of the CotmC11 or the M.embly ari81Dg 
OQt. ot artT diapuw bftW'8a the Un1\e4 Ita. and. &IV' IlfDber of the 
League it such lIaIber, or an:r eeU-sO'Nl'll1Da da1n1oa, oal.onv ..... 
pin or part of .-p1re UD1tect With it. pollt.1cal.lJ baa .ot.eci.l.o 
!be result wu that .. put 1t up to the countries wno are DlOI!St like 
17 IbU •• hh99. 
18 C2!£!!81caal Re;oortl, 66 COl'll., 2 a.s._, 1920, 4061. 
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us 111 language and customs, in blood and. ill r~ligion, and whoae international 
problema are most ald.n to ours, either to have an:r action of the League in 
1dti.eh thq participated open to question or disayowal. IX1 our pan or to gi .... 
WI a representation which would upset the principle of the equality of .'tate-
the only basis UPon which there was a chance of bu:J]d;lng the League. It might 
be true enough that ffr8'q ..:ber of the League would in prac't1.ce wield. intlu-
enOe in propon1on to its PGlfV and resources, but the smallest atat .. priaed 
their tormal equality in the ffllLily of na1;ions. The action of the AJlerioan 
senate Ddght be due solely to int,ernal politics; nevertheless, the dAmtlopinl 
nationalities within the British Impire could h~ be expecWd to sink back 
to a lwer statu at 0Ul" request nor the pQWertul Allies to allow multiple 
votes without inoreasing our ow.. 
The ohaoa clue to tollov such a scramble tor power and place ... of 
no conseqwmce to the S ... tora. Nor were t,hq conoemed over '\he probable re-
jenion of thia oonditi. to our ent17 into the Leape. People u prowl u 
0Ul'8 were expected. to acquiRe.. The ad.Tea" of the British Domirdon to na-
tioDhood, which their lIIlUIbersbip in iihe 'eace coutercce an.c:1 in t.h6 Laagu.e 
had AmlOlitl.Ced had. been oordially accepted. ~ the other nations and conwated 
b7 none, no matter how alien to thea in culture and. 1ut.1tuttons the new: 
a"a".. thu recogDised might 'be. It raMi ned. for the leaders of the oount.r,r 
JIlO8t akin to thea to preach as supposed clomi Dation that aroused. nobody elee. 
Shonq betore the final 'f'O't,e in March, 1920, a. combination of 
Democrats and Republicans spoUed. the aymaet.ry or the 'curteen Besern.t1ona 
b7 add~ng a fifteenth, on the subject of Ireland. Introduced b;r Senator 
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0erl7, Democrat of PJl.ode Island.- it was frownf}d on by the Lodge RepublicaDS as 
an ettort to hold the Irish vote or )8 to 36, ~rith the bitterenders enthusi-
astioally voting yea. The Republicans divided 18 tor and 20 againstr The 
Democrats split 20 tor and 16 against. 
the last of the reservations set forth that. 
In consenting to the r-a.tif'ication of the treaty with Germa.V 
the United States adheres to the princi;Jle or selt-determ1nation 
and to the resolution ot s)'mpa:tJ'~ with the aspirations of the Irish 
people tor a government ot their own choice adopted 'b'-J the Senate 
June 6, 1919, azxi declares t1'lat when such a government 18 attained 
to Ireland, a coosunnation it is hoped is at hand, it should proo.pt-
q be aimittad as a member of the League of Nationa.19 
The Senate in one reservation dared ~ even to consid.er any-
thing that we might label a domestic question, and in another encouraged a 
separate movement in the tarritoI7 of a friendly all;y. In one reservation it 
inveighed against the six Bri Usb votes in the Assembly I and in another prqed 
tor the creation ot a sevent.h. Strangely enough, too, this last. wish of the 
Senate is the only one t!'lat was granted. The Irish Free State has been a 
proud and. active member of the League or Nations since 1923.20 
The second, which was the most disputed. reservation read - in 
November. 
The United states US'W1le8 no obligation to preserve the terri-
torial or political independence ·0£ alV other oountry or to interfere 
in controversies bett/8eU nationa.....whether memberu of the ~ or 
not--under the provision of Article lO" or to employ the military or 
uaval. torces o£ the United States under any article of the treaty for 
an::! purpose, unless in any particular case the Congress, whioh under 
19 Ibid., 4499. 
20 Fleming, United States .2 .!!!!! Leaeme, 433. 
the Canst! tutton, his sole poW'er to decllU'e war or authorize the 
emplOJ1llS!lt of military or naval forces of the United States shall 
by act of joint resolution so provide.21 
On ~1arch 12, Lodge,of'fered a substitute by adding "ita resources 
or any form of economic discrimination." This invalidated the cla1m of the 
mild reservationiBts that the reservations left the economic bo;ycott in fun 
force. 
Th1a sharpening of' the reservationista caused the irreconciliablea 
to set up a wail that the new drat't was realJJr a surrender by Lodge. '.i:hey 
considered it weaker tban the original. So the phrase "including aU oontro-
versies relating to territorial lntegr.l.ty or political independence," vas in-
serted to make sure that the article real.:Qr negatived. 'the torm of' t.b.e final 
reservation was therefore: 
The United states assumes no obligation to preserve the terr1-
torial integrity or poll tical indep(;:lldence of' any other country by 
the employment of' its milltary or naval forces, its resources, or 
any form of economic disori.Idnation, or to interfere in any wq in 
controversies between nations, including all territories relating 
to territorial. integrity or political. independence, whether members 
of the League or not, under the provision of Art.lcle 10, or to employ 
the mU1tary or Daval f'oroe of the United Stai;es, under any artiole 
of the treaty for any prupose, unless in any particular case or the 
Congress, whioh under the Coneti tution has the sole power to declare 
war or authorize the employment of' the milital"'J or naval f'oroes of 
the United Sta.tes, shill in the exercise c.! .t'ull liberly ot action 
by act or joint resolution so provide.22 
The treaty came to a. vote on ?4aroh 19, 1920 and i' ailed to reeel ve 
the necessary two-thirds majority by a vote of 49 yeas to 3, nays. The nqs 
oonsisted of 12 "irreoonc1l1able" Republicans, plus twenty-three Democrats 
21 CogI1!8sional Reoord. 66 Cong., 2 Sass., 4211. 
22 Ibid., 4324. 
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who remaiued loyal to Wilson. 
Since it was obvious that the treaty would not;:e rat.tried without 
reservations, t1Jooty-one Democrats forsook their leader and voted for approval4 
This may not havo hapvened had the l'resident been silent. He asked for com-
plete viotor,y and rece1 ved none. 
The failure of the President t s plan ~ be attrlbut«1 to lllaUY 
causes. Among the 1mportant i"!.Ctors were i~'!lora.noe or the treaty, COf'..:f'usion. 
of thought, jealousy of Senatorial prerogative, personal hatred ot tl:1.lson, and 
a strong tradi tionaJ. policy of isolation. Reservations killed the treaty. 
The Lodge reservations 'Were added by an almost solid Republlcan vote and oppos-
ed by an almost solid Democratic vote. Tids evidence suggests that partisan 
politics pure and simple contributed more than 8.l\Ything elae to the de.teat or 
'Wilson in the Senate. H ad he been a RepubH.can the d eciBion might have been 
reversed. 
j/ilson's p~8ical collapse was a vital factor in the outcome. He 
might have seen the wisdom or accepting a compromise it he had. been well, a.m 
had been more close~ in touo..i. ld.th the drift ot publlc op1n1on. But he was 
probahq not f'ulq cognizant of' the true s~te of atf'aira. Subbol'fl an:l of a 
single-track mind, he liSS permitted to see only a few people, and tr..ese were 
loath to shock tlle sick man with disagreeable realities. Whether propel'~ in-
formed. or not, Wilson rejected t.~e Lodge reservations outright, apparently 
hoping that in 1920 the voters would rise up and deIllaIld an 'Wlema8culated 
League. 
CHAPTl'lt V • 
The Senate having failed twice to approve the treaty, it was re-
turned t.o the President and. the majority leaders moved a. joint resolution, 
April 1, 1920, 'lfhicb attempted to end the legal state of war with Germany by 
the same method which inaugura.ted it. This resolution pasaecl1n both houses 
by substantial majorities, was vetoed by President Wilson }1ay 27th, and tailed 
ot passage over his veto by a vote of 220 tor repasaage to 152 against. f.fr. 
Wilson vetoed the message hoping somehow that the people would demand the 
treaty 1n the a.pproaching presidential election.1 
The Republican National Convention found it di.f't1cult. to frame an 
acceptable pUnk on the League, because lti'i t.'hJ.n the party there were It irre-
concilab1es," reseI"V'at..ionists, and advooates of the League. It was apparently 
a platform that was a masterpiece of amblgu1 ty and was worded as to enable 
all shades ot r.epublicana to support the party in the confident belief' that 
their views would be sustained. The first paragraph read was to those who 
wanted the League. It promised at the veri least a oonsultative part, with 
the nations whereby "instant and. general conferenceU should be had. whensveJ' 
the peace was threatened. The second. paragraph denounced. the Covenant in 
words grave enough to suit any bitter opponent of the League as "certain" to 
produce "the injustioe, hostility, and oontroversy among nat.ions which it pro-
1 C~8ional Record, 66 Cong., 2 Seas., 1920, 5129. 
posed to prevent"- The Reservation1sts were &e.tisf1ed 'by a suggestion that 
perhaps the coming adm1n1stration would tom a new andQrtter "association" o£ 
nations which would doubtless be both Republican and American. "Sucb agree-
ment With the other nations or the world as shall meet the full duty ot 
America to civillzation and to humanitY"--with reservations, of course.2 
Deadlocked over a nominee, the Republ1can Convention turned, as 
a compromise choice, to the handsome and affable Senator Warren G. Harding 
of Ohio.' Ue wes easiq manageable, and a regular Republican. He had been a 
somewhat mechanical opponent or the League during the tight, and had. c~ 
l:dmselt to the attention or the party bosses months before tbe convention met. 
The prospects, which were hiS, improved when be declared. that. ".A.mericats vre-
sent ~ is not heroics but hea.1.ingJ not nostrums but nomalOYf not revol.u-
tion but restoration •••• It Harding, the antithesis at Wilson, was the man 
ror the timea. Unlike the unapproachable President, he was baiWellaw...well-
met. To be sure he was not an intellectual heavyweight. Wilson spoke of his 
"bungalow mind." out as one Republ1can Senator Said, the times did not de-
mand tt.t1rst raters.at 
The Democratic Convention oonvened. in San Francisoo. and faced 
si.Ular ditficulties in taking its stand. and choosing its candidate. The oca-
plated platf'orm, commending the President tor his c oura.ge and. good. faith and 
-
2 William F. Johnson, 2!O!le H!!:!!l, Boston, 1929, 281-89 • 
.3 ~., 278. 
4 Ibid., 280. 
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cha.rg1ng that the Republican SE;mate refused to' rati.t.7 tb.e treaty' flme~ be-
cause it was the product· of Democratic stateamaDship,tt declared for the 
League of Nations n as the surest. 1£ not the only practicable means of main-
taining the permanent peace and terminating the insufferable burden of great 
military and naval establishments." 
The attitude of the Democrats toward reservations was defined as 
tollOWSt 
We endorse the President's view or our int.emational obligations 
and his firm stand. against reservations designed to cut to pieces 
the vital provision of the Versailles 'rreaty and. we commend the 
Democrats in Congress tor voting against resolutions for separate 
peace which would diSff,TaCO the natlon. We advocate the 1mmediate 
ratification of the treaty without reservations which would impair 
its essenM.eJ. integrity, but do not OVlJOSe the acceptance or rese~ 
tions making clearer or more specific the obligations of the Unitec1 
states to the League Associates. 
'£h.o Democrats selected as their nominee, Govemor flax of Ohio. 
The resulting carnpaign was a l1atless affair, in spite of Wilson's request 
that it be a grea.t and solemn re.teren.dum. There can be no doubt that by th1B 
ti2"8 the electorate was thoroughly wear,y or the treaty issue now nearly two 
years old. The sOOlewb&t confused Harding took, so clairned his oppooent, tou.:r-
teen dif"feront sta.'1da on the League question. Perhaps his most oonsistent 
noto was that af'ter the election he would consult With the "best mindsfl to the 
end "tnat we shall bave an association of nations for the lJrOlnotion or inter-
national peace.tt5 In ahort, not a Democratic ttLeaguefi but a Republioation 
"Associat:i.on.'" Mr. Chester nowell, a well-informed Republican journalist 
wrote, 
-
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.. 
One halt of the speeches were for tpe League of Nations i.t 
you read them hastily, but if yr:JU read tllem with care every word 
of them could have been read critically as against. the League of 
Nations. The other half were violent speecbes against the League 
if you read. them careleesly. but if you read them or1 t,ically every-
one of the.."'rl could be interpreted as in favor of the League of Nations.6 
But all this did not disturb the electorate very much. Back to 
Normalcy, was the winning slogan. 
The result was a .foregone conclusion. on the eve of the elect.ion 
odds were ten to one against Cox. Hundreds of tbousands of eligible vaters 
staJ,-ed I1Wq .from tl".ie polls. v;earied of Wilionism, the i'est rose up and cast. 
a tremendous vote for Hardi.llg. As Joseph Tumulty, tlilson's secretary said, 
"It was not a landslide, it was an earthqueke.n7 
Was ttl" Republican triumph a repudiation ot the L~""Ue. as Lodge 
gloatingly asserted? There were 80 mellY isaues, ranging from prollibit1-on of 
alcoholic beverages to sel.f'-determination for Ireland, that it would be diffi. 
cult to sB¥ whet..lter the results were made a mandate on any one of them. The 
Republican platfol"r11 was so ambiguous and the candidate 80 plat! tudinous that 
"1rreconcilables" like Senators Borah and Johnson supported Harding as the 
surest. wq of keeping the country out of the League" while th1rty..one pr<R1n-
ant Republicans, 1ncluding Root, Hughes and Hoover, signed a man:i.i"eato 
announcing t.hat t.hey were voting .for Harding as the surest vq of getting the 
country into the Le&.gue. Perhaps the Democratic !!!! !2!:! _~_or ... l d_ was not tar 
from the mark when it observed, "The American people wanted a change and theJr 
6 Quoted in Fleming, United ptate~.!2! ~ Le!SEt!, 460. 
7 Blum, Josepl: Tumul;tz .!!!! 1h! lIiilson Era, 259. 
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have voted for a ohar1f;e. They do not know what. ld.nd oJ: ohange they wanted, 
and, they do not know tocie¥ what. kind or change they bave voted for." If the 
results were a. mandate on ruvtl'dng they were a mandate tran the people to re-
lax-to get. aiIl&y tram Wilsonism and to :return to "normalcy." 
CUrJCLUSION 
wUson was master.ful, unresponsive "to advice, avowedly partisan 
and uncompromising in denumdins acceptance of his plan. He had never enj oyed. 
service in Congress and repeatedly misinterpreted the temper of the Senete anc1 
of the House, and engaged. in useless controversies. Beoause or his ignorance 
of the ~Iays and rules of the Senate, \Olil8on lost his greatest, battle. 
Just be.tore he began the task of peri'ect1ng his peace plan and. ].q-
ing it batore the nations at Paris, wilson made this m:1.8take. He appealed to 
the people to elect Democra.ts to Congress, on the plea. that he could not otbel'" 
wise be the "unembarrassed spokesman" of the United States. Congress at th.at 
time was controlled 11".1 Democrats, tnt lJartis&nSP..ip was in abeyance. It tlamed. 
into wbite heat inswmtly and in the election that tollOW'ed a few dE\,vs after 
Wilson's plea, I..he people tranaferred control. of Congress to the Republican 
party. 
The 1ntense~ bitter feeling ot' Republicans and independent voters 
against Wilson's injection ot partisanship in the rddst of war was carried in-
to the Senate and became a factor in the defeat of Wilson's peace plan. But 
it was not a prime factor. Later events revealed that the basic reason that 
caused the United States to avoid membership in the League or Nations was the 
conflict between the J4!onroe Doctrine and the Covenant. The Un! ted States 
Senate could not maintain the integrl. ty of the Monroe Doctrine and at the same 
time consent· to intervention by the League in the political attain or the 
Western Hemisphere. 
WilBon invited partisan opposition again when he eJCCluded the 
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Republ1cans trom consultation in the development of his peace plan and frart 
partioipation in peace negotiations at Paris. 
Wilson knew that one third and more of the Senate opposed his plan 
to intertwine the League of !lations witb the Treaty of Versailles. What he 
tailed to oonsider was that the Senate could adopt amendments and reservations 
to treaties by majority vote. He believed that a two-thirds vote was necessar: 
to change a treaty in the Senate. Therefore he insisted that the treaty ehou.lA 
be approved 11 1 thout change, fully believing that publlc sentiment would sup-
port him and on all sides it was admitted that the people tavored the Wilson 
plan at tho time he admitted it to the Senate. 
When the Senate proceeded to make changes in the treaty by majority 
vote, Wilson sought to win popul.:lr support tor uncoOOitional approval by mak-
ing his western trip. 
Republicans f'u.rni8hed most of the votes for reservations, but 
Democrats turnished some votes in each case. Partisanship was not the motive 
ot Senators in voting upon sane reservations, especi~p attar public opposi-
tion developed against uncond.1t:.onal ratification. The reservations gained 
approval even among Democrats in ~~e Senate·. 
There were forty-seven De."IlOCrats in the Senate, but upon the motion 
to approve the treaty unoondition~ only thirty-seven Democrats votes were 
'\Yes and the motion was de.f"eated by a vote or fitty-three nayes to thirty-
eight yeas. ScrlSl'l Democrats refused 1;0 accept the treaty without modUie ... 
tion. Since all the reservations ~lel'O adopted by bipartisall votes it is evi-
dent that somethir~ more than partisanship was at work in the Senate in re-
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jecting the Treaty of Versailles. Objections 'Were registered against both 
. 
the Covenant and other parte of the Treaty. l\mong the reasons for popular 
disapproval of the Treaty of Versailles, after debate in the Senate had illu-
minated the subject were theser 
The people were not w.l.lling to guarantee the terr1torial integrity 
or poll tical independence of other countries, they wanted the Monroe Doctrine 
to 18 excepted entire~ from the jurisdiction or the League, tb.e"J objected to 
the transfer of' Shantung from China to Japan, they insisted upon exclusive 
American jurisdiotion over pure:13 d<De8t1c questions like imm1grationJ and 
~ objected to giving other nations more votes than the United States in 
the League Assembly. 
Again andsgain the question arises, "Should the United States have 
ratified. the treaty and joined the League?" We had. very little to lose ruld 
everything to gain, poesibly a preventing or .o-called World VIP" II. No na-
tion was ever trapped in the League as our isolationists warnedf Japan got 
out, Oemany got out, Russia was thrown out. Where the possible lossee vera 
so negl1g1ble and the probable gains 80 tremendous the United. States as 
WUson repeatedly pointed out, was more than jwst1fied in wid ng the cbance. 
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